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STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: RIGHTS
"WAIVED" AND LOST IN THE ARBITRATION
FORUM
Reginald Alleyne*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Can the statutory right to a federal or state court forum for a federal
age-discrimination claim be waived by an employee's prior agreement--entered into as a condition of being employed-to arbitrate
employment termination disputes in a forum unilaterally structured by his
employer?' Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.2 , a 1991 United
States Supreme Court decision, holds that the answer is yes

Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
I thank the following for supporting the research effort leading to this article: Margaret
Echevarria, third-year UCLA Law student, for valuable research assistance, UCLA Law School's
Dean Susan Prager, for providing the necessary research funds, the UCLA reference law librarians,
Linda Maisner in particular, for their uncommonly swift and efficient abilities to produce nearly
anything in print, no matter how obscure the document or the request. Benjamin Aaron, David
Feller, Alvin Goldman, James Jones, Carrie Menckel-Meadow, and Charles Rehmus graciously read
early drafts with a critical eye. I benefitted from every suggestion, including those few of the lot
with which I did not agree.
1. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). On May 26, 1981,
eight days after he was hired by Interstate, Gilmer completed and signed a "Uniform Application for
Securities Industries Registration Transfer" (Form U-4), paragraph five of which provided:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my
firm, or a customer, or any other person that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions or bylaws of the organizations with which I register, as indicated in
Question 8.
Id. at 23. The applicable "rule" for Gilmer was Rule 347 of the New York Stock Exchange
[hereinafter NYSE], governing employment disputes:
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member
organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be
settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party, in accordance with the arbitration
procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCII) 2347, at 3599 (Rule 347) (1995).
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. Id. at 35.
*
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Interstate terminated Robert Gilmer, then sixty-two years old,4 and
replaced him with a twenty-eight year old as Senior Vice President,
Manager of Mutual Funds.' Following the venue provisions of the
federal Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),6
Gilmer filed a federal district court complaint alleging a violation of the
ADEA, seeking lost wages and benefits, reinstatement, and reasonable
attorney's fees.7
Interstate responded with a motion to compel arbitration and to
dismiss Gilmer's complaint It relied on Gilmer's securities registration
application which contained, among other things, an agreement to
arbitrate when required to do so by NYSE rules, and the enforceability
of the arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 9 Gilmer argued that his agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable, because the FAA does not cover employment contracts and, in any
event, the ADEA itself implicitly prohibits waiver of its venue requirements.10
The district court agreed with Gilmer."
However, Interstate
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and won." Gilmer then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 which held that Gilmer was bound
by his agreement to use the arbitration forum. 4 Because an arbitrator
in his case would be bound to follow the substantive law of the ADEA,
the Court held that Gilmer would lose no substantive rights in the
arbitration forum. 5 It therefore follows, according to the Supreme
Court, that the ADEA neither expressly nor impliedly precludes

4. Id. at 23.

5. Joint App. for Writ of Cert. at 8, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (No. 90-18).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
7. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 24; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The FAA was originally enacted in
1925. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp.
V 1994)). It was re-enacted and codified in 1947 in Title 9 of the United States Code. It provides
for specific performance of agreements to arbitrate disputes affecting commerce. Id. § 4 (1994).
It is mainly applicable to non-labor disputes and has never been explicitly held to govern the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate disputes between unions and employers over the meaning
of collective bargaining agreements. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 27.

10. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 27.
11. Id. at24.
12. 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990).

13. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 24.
14. Id. at 35.

15. Id. at 29.
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agreements to waive a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. 6 Lower
courts have applied the Gilmer decision to the arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,7 including sexual harassment cases.1 8
Employers are responding to the decision by making agreements to
arbitrate employment disputes a condition of employment. 9 Not
surprisingly, Gilmer has spawned legitimate concerns about its effect on
the enforcement of what has been described in different contexts as "a
national policy against discrimination."2 How might that policy be

affected by the decision? Will it flourish in a sea of swiftly decided
arbitration decisions, each one applying the law as would federal courts?
Or will the policy whither away in a mishmash of unconnected,
independently and privately decided "final and binding" arbitration

decisions?
This article argues that the Gilmer decision carries alternative
dispute resolution to excess. It permits the relegation of public-law

16. Id.; see also Shearson/Amer. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,227 (1987) (adding
to the criteria for deducing whether Congress intended to preclude the arbitration of statutory claims
by stating that in addition to a statute's text or legislative history, preclusion may be deduced from
"an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.'). BeforeGilmerwas
decided, the Third Circuit, relying on the McMahon "inherent conflict" test decided against the future
Gilmer outcome. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, 877 F.2d 221,227 (3d Cir. 1989). Among the dispositive
factors are both the absence of power of the EEOC to affect the arbitration procedure and the
inadequacy of arbitration to effectively enforce the ADEA. Id. at 228. The decision created a
conflict with the Fourth Circuit's Gilmer decision, prompting review by the Supreme Court.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
18. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d
1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (1 lth Cir. 1992); Benefits
Communications Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 contains nothing in conflict with Gilmer). Legislative history, however, makes it
questionable whether the Gilmer decision applies to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
[hereinafter ADA], 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994). See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 76-77 (1990); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 89
(1990). Likewise, legislative history may be read to preclude Gilmer's application to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991; see also H.R. REP.No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 68 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992).
20. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,47 (1974) (finding that "Congress
indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the 'highest priority."';
Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zips, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (stating that the "central
purpose of section 706(k) is to vindicate the national policy against wrongful discrimination...");
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1982) (concluding that "racial
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental public policy.. ."); see also Michael C.
Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, And The Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The
Failure of The Older Workers Benefit ProtectionAct, 79 VA. L. RaV. 1271 (1993) (describing the
enactment of that Act as "further proof of a national consensus against age discrimination.").
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statutory discrimination issues to a forum in which the advantages of
judicial review and the relative competence of judges presiding over
public trials can be discarded in favor of a procedurally defective private
forum like the one Gilmer was forced to accept in order to retain his
job.

21

Suppose the Supreme Court had determined that ADEA substantive
rights could have been lost in the securities industry arbitration forum set
up for Gilmer and other industry employees. The Court would then
almost certainly have found an implied provision in the ADEA barring
waiver of a federal court forum.' But with an incomplete inquiry, the
Supreme Court comfortably concluded that Gilmer's "challenges to the
adequacy of arbitration procedures... [are] insufficient to preclude
arbitration. 2 3
As further developed here, the Court's statement that the arbitrators
for Gilmer's age discrimination claim were qualified to decide statutory
discrimination claims2 4 has since been refuted by competent empirical
inquiry.2" The Court's finding in Gilmer that the same arbitrators had
to write written opinions26 was based on a misreading of the applicable
arbitration rules.
Also its determination that the securities industry
discovery rules were sufficient to allow Gilmer to prove his claim were
at best questionable." Other substantive-rights defeating problems with
the arbitration rules relevant to Gilmer's claim were not discussed. The
Gilmer decision thus hinges weakly on the dubious assumption that the
opportunity to vindicate statutory substantive rights can survive a change
in forum when the change is accompanied by substantial changes in
governing procedural rules and a change in the culture of the forum.

21. Excluded from the scope of this article is arbitration ordered by a judge who retains
jurisdiction over the dispute, and where either party to the arbitration may seek a post-arbitration trial
de novo. For a discussion of this topic see, Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HARV.L. REV. 668 (1986).

22. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (where the Court found that it must
"assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include
protection against waiver of the right to judicial forum, that intention will be deductible from the text
or legislative history.").
23. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
24. Id.
25. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, Employment Discrimination:
How RegisteredRepresentativesFare in DiscriminationDisputes, at 12 (GAO/HEHS-94-17, Mar.
30, 1994) [hereinafter G.A.O. REPORT].
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
27. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2627, at 4322-23 (Rule 627) (1995).

28. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
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The general assumption that arbitration for Gilmer was nothing more
than a transfer of forum is almost certainly invalid. His securities
industry arbitration forum, as demonstrated here, would actually have
provided him with fewer procedural rights than he would have enjoyed
not only in federal district court but in a labor arbitration forum and a
conventional commercial arbitration forum as well. The procedural
deficiencies of Gilmer's intended securities industry arbitration forum had
the potential to govern powerfully the substantive outcome of his agediscrimination claim.2 9 The hidden motive behind the decision is a
widely held desire by judges, including United States Supreme Court
justices, to reduce judicial caseloads in the face of burgeoning employment claims of all kinds30
II.

THE SEMINAL CASES

Gilmer" was the second of two Supreme Court decisions to place
in tension a national policy against discrimination and a national policy
3 3 held
in favor of arbitration. 32 In 1974, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
that a union's loss of a discrimination claim taken to arbitration under the
union's collective bargaining agreement did not operate as a waiver of
the employee's right to file later a parallel statutory discrimination claim
in federal district court. 34 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System3" reached a similar conclusion in a case involving the arbitration of
a Fair Labor Standards Act claim.36 Both decisions relied in part on the
inadequacy of labor arbitration as a forum for the resolution of statutory
claims.37 The inadequacy included lack of labor arbitrators' expertise

29. See id. at 30-32.
30. See David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The DecliningState ofLabor Arbitration,48 ARB.

J. 18, 19-20 (Sept. 1993).
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
32. See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United
Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior

& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Court determined that "the FAA not only 'declared a national
policy favoring arbitration,"' but actually "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration."
115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215-16 (1995) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).

33. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
34. Id. at 47.
35. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).

36. Id. at 738.
37. Id.; Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 53-54.
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to cope with the complexities of the involved federal statutes.3" As
argued here, arbitration's procedural deficiencies and lack of arbitrator
expertise to interpret statutes should logically support both the denial of
a motion to dismiss judicial proceedings on prior arbitration grounds and
the denial of a motion to dismiss judicial proceedings and compel
arbitration on grounds of contractual waiver. Support for this conclusion
requires .as background a more detailed description of the two related
pre-Gilmer United States Supreme Court decisions.
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,39 a union-represented
employee, Harrell Alexander, was fired by Gardner-Denver for "producing too many defective or unusable parts . .,40 Alexander then filed
a grievance against Garner-Denver.4 ' His union took the case to
arbitration for a "final and binding" decision under its collective
bargaining agreement.42 The Union alleged that Alexander's discharge
violated a clause in the agreement providing that "[n]o employee will be
discharged... except for just cause."'43 At the arbitration hearing, the
Union for the first time argued that Alexander's discharge was motivated
by racial discrimination.' However, the arbitrator did what no federal
district judge could have done without being reversed. He denied the
grievance without addressing the racial-discrimination claim.45
Alexander then filed a federal district court complaint concerning
the same alleged race-based termination, arguing that his termination

38. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743.
39. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id.at 42.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.

45. See id. at 43. The arbitrator simply agreed with the Company's argument that Alexander
produced too many unusable parts (scrap). Id. He did not resolve the issue inherent in all
discrimination claims: whether the Company's claim that Alexander produced too much scrap was
a pretext for a discharge motivated by an unlawful intent to discriminate on grounds of race? Nor

is it possible to conclude that the arbitrator's findings on Alexander's scrap-production rate was
necessarily a decision that Alexander was not the victim of racial discrimination. The discrimination-context issue, properly considered by the arbitrator, would have been whether-if Alexander's

scrap-production had been unsatisfactory--white employees with similar production records were
disciplined at all and, even if so, were they disciplined as severely as Alexander?
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violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.46 Gardner-Denver
moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of election of remedies and
waiver.47 It argued that having elected arbitration, Alexander could not
bring to federal district court a second proceeding on the same discrimination claim; that to decide otherwise would mean arbitration awards are
final and binding only when the union wins!' The district court
agreed, granted Gardner-Denver's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the complaint.49 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 0
In a unanimous opinion the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.5 ' First, the statutory rights conferred by Title
VII are separate and distinct from the contractual rights created by a
collective bargaining agreement; it follows that the exercise of one does
not preclude the right to pursue the other. 2 Second, the Court found
that arbitration53 is not an adequate forum for statutory employment
discrimination claims.54 The criticism of labor arbitration as a forum
for Title VII claims cited faulty arbitration procedures and the relative
5
incompetence of arbitrators to decide themY.
The Court emphasized
that the Gardner-Denver arbitrator would have exceeded his authority
under the collective bargaining agreement if he had based his decision on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or any legislation. 6 A third basis for
the decision, union control of the arbitration process and the consequent
possibilities of union-employer collusion, was also suggested. 7

46. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (D. Colo. 1971); see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to e-17(1988 & Supp. V 1994).
47. Gardner-Denver,346 F. Supp. at 1014.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1019.
50. 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).

51. 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
52. Id. at 48-50.
53. In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court used the term "arbitration" and not "labor

arbitration." See generally Gardner-Denver415 U.S. 36 (1974). Some of its comments on
"arbitration" as an inadequate forum for statutory discrimination claims would apply only to labor
arbitration. Other aspects of its analysis would apply to commercial arbitration as well.

54. Id. at 56-57.
55. Id. at 57. The Court noted that the "specialized competence of arbitrators pertains to the
law of the shop, not the law of the land." Id.

56. Id. at 53.
57. Id. at 58 n.19 (noting that another concern with arbitration of statutory matters is "the

union's exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented."). The same footnote makes a single-sentence reference to possible union-employer collusion
in a racial discrimination grievance. 1d. A hypothetical case illustrates what the Court perhaps
thought could follow from a grievance alleging, for example, sex discrimination:
A female employee, W, in a male-dominated and newly sex-integrated bargaining unit,
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In assessing arbitration, the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver
appears to have had in mind two distinct arbitration forum contexts. In
one, arbitration was viewed as adequate for the resolution of grievances
over the meaning of collective bargaining agreements. 8 That assess-

ment was validly based on the history of labor arbitration as an important
and effective component of collective bargaining."

It is settled in

American labor law that where there is an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement, labor arbitrators, not judges or quasijudicial agencies, exclusively interpret disputed collective-bargaining
agreement terms.60
It was arbitration's attribute of "informality", the Court observed,
that enabled it to "function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious

files a grievance alleging sex discrimination. The union, sympathetic to the work-place
values of its predominantly male constituency, is reluctant to take her grievance to
arbitration, but the union is also reluctant to face a breach of the duty of fair representation law suit, and it believes--with good reason--that W will file one if the union refuses
to invoke arbitration for her. Faced with these conflicting considerations, the union does
the one thing that will avoid the law suit and also satisfy its male constituents. It takes
W's case to arbitration with insufficient vigor to win, but with enough apparent vigor to
mask its intention to lose. The employer has reason to believe that the union is not
determined to win the case and knows the reasons why. The arbitrator denies the
grievance. The decision is "final and binding." Sexist male workers are satisfied. The
Union is satisfied that its core constituency is satisfied. The employer is satisfied with
the result. W is either unaware of the union's lack of a full effort in her behalf, or is
aware of both it and the nearly insurmountable obstacles standing in the way of proving
it. No breach of the duty of fair representation action is filed against the Union.
58. See id. at 56.
59. See id. 52-54.
60. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs, 25-32 (4th ed.

1985) [hereinafter ELKOURI & ELKOURI]; see also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957) (holding that section 301 of the LMRA authorizes the federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of collective agreements to arbitrate). In 1960 the Supreme Court
decided three cases which found that when the collective bargaining agreement contained an
arbitration clause, the arbitrator, and not the courts, were to hear the dispute. See United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,565,568 (1960) (where the collective bargaining
agreement contained a clause providing for the arbitration of all disputes between the parties "as to
the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement," the function of the
court is limited to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which, on its
face, is governed by the agreement, and the court has "no business weighing the merits of the
grievance. . .');
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960)
(holding that since the parties had agreed that any dispute "as to the meaning... of this Agreement"
would be determined by arbitration, it was for an arbitrator, not the courts, to decide whether the
"contracting out" involved in this case violated the collective bargaining agreement.); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (stating that "the question
of interpretation of collective bargaining agreement[s]," where there is an arbitration clause, "is a
question for the arbitratorfl," and "the courts have no business overruling his construction of the
contract merely because the interpretation of it is different from... [the judge's].").
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means for [labor] dispute resolution."6
The positive arbitration
attributes become negative attributes for the resolution of statutory
claims, according to the Gardner-Denver'sdecision.6'
The cited statutory-discrimination-case context deficiencies
associated with labor arbitration's informality are mainly procedural: the
inapplicability of rules of evidence,6" the unavailability or severe
limitation of discovery,' the sometimes absence or limitation of
compulsory process, cross-examination and testimony under oath,6" and
the absence of arbitrators' obligations to provide reasons for their
awards.66 Labor arbitrators lacked competence to decide statutory
discrimination claims because "the specialized competence of arbitrators
pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land. 61
Union and employer parties who select arbitrators "trust ...[the labor
arbitrator's] knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms
of industrial relations ....68
"On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional
issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has
proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad
language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public
law concepts."69 The Gardner-Denver opinion should not be read
solely as a critique of the individual labor arbitrator who decided Harrell
Alexander's grievance. The decision's comments on arbitrator competence addressed labor arbitrators as a class and the adequacy of
Alexander's arbitration forum was discussed almost entirely in procedural
context.

61. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 58.
62. Id.

63. Id. at 57.
64. Id. at 57-58.
65. Id. Here, however, the Court overstated this factor. Rarely if ever would the right to crossexamination be denied in a labor arbitration proceeding and the failure to permit it would be grounds
for vacating the award under most state arbitration statutes.

66. Id. at 58.
67. Id. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,58183 (1960)).
68. Id.
69. Id. The comments on arbitrator competence were made in the face of a discrimination
clause in the union-Gardner-Denver collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 57-58. Parties to
the agreement had thus implicitly deemed the mutually-selected arbitrator competent to decide a
discrimination claim based on a contractual standard paralleling the Title VII statutory standard. The
Gardner-Denveropinion, then, may fairly be read as finding in favor of the relative incompetence
of arbitrators to decide discrimination claims, even though the parties to the agreement had at least

implicitly reached a contrary conclusion.
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The Court, however, did not discuss how the nature of a discrimination claim might make an arbitrator reluctant to decide a statutory
discrimination case against an employer. Nor did it discuss differences
between the remedies likely to be awarded by courts and by arbitrators,
or the deterrent effect of arbitration results handed down in a private
contractual proceeding.
Arguably, it was unnecessary for the court to delve so deeply into
arbitration's inadequacies in order to make the case that Alexander was
entitled to proceed in federal court following his loss in a labor
arbitration forum. Gilmer's case, with no union involvement, was
unencumbered by a need for the Court to make a Gardner-Denver-type
analysis based on distinctions between contractual and statutory claims.
Consequently, more so than in Gardner-Denver, Gilmer's case was
amenable to resolution on the basis of an inadequate-arbitration-forum
analysis.
B.

Barrentine

Almost eight years after Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court
decided a very similar case in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Systems Inc.7" The main difference, however, was that in Barrentine,
the object of the employee's post-grievance-arbitration claim was an
alleged violation of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"). 7 t A joint grievance committee interpreted the
collective bargaining agreement to deny a grievance over whether time
taken to inspect a truck and travel to the truck for the inspection was
"time worked" within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.72 In a post-arbitration action filed in federal district court, the
district judge refused, on prior arbitration grounds, to consider plaintiffs'
FLSA claim.73
The Court of Appeals affirmed.7 4 Relying on
Gardner-Denver,the Supreme Court reversed.7 5 Separate discussions

70. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
71. Id. at 729-30. The contractual time-worked claim and the judicial FLSA claim implicated
different sources of authority for the claims, but the two claims arose out of the same facts. Id.; 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
72. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 731. The joint grievance committee may be equated with
"arbitrator" in that it had the power under the collective bargaining agreement to render a "final and

binding" decision as the last step in the grievance-arbitration process. Id. at 731 n.5.
73. Id. at 731-33.

74. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 615 F.2d 1194, 1201 (8th Cir. 1980).
75. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 745.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss2/3

10

19961

Alleyne: Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the
Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum

of forum adequacy, discrete claims--one contractual, one statutory-and
waiver, as they appeared in the Gardner-Denveropinion, were merged
as one in the Barrentine Court's summary description of GardnerDenver:
[This] Court found that in enacting Title VII, Congress had granted
individual employees a nonwaivable, public law right to equal employment opportunities that was separate and distinct from the rights created
through the 'majoritarian processes' of collective bargaining....
Moreover, because Congress had granted aggrieved employees access
to the courts, and because contractual grievance and arbitration
procedures provided an inadequate forum for enforcement of Title VII
rights, the Court [in Gardner-Denver] concluded that Title VII claims
should be resolved by the courts de novo.76
The Barrentine decision extended Gardner-Denver' teachings on
discrimination statutes to include all federal statutes "designed to provide
77
minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.,
As in Gardner-Denver, but with greater precision, the Court in
Barrentine identified "two reasons why an employee's right to a
minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA might be lost if
submission of [a] wage claim to arbitration precluded [the employee]
from later bringing an FLSA suit in federal court."78 First, the Court
noted that the main reason why a union might not fully present an
employee's wage claim to an arbitrator is that the FLSA is an individual
rights statute and unions are interested in group rights.79 Then it
concluded that "[t]hese statutory questions of the [FLSA] must be
resolved in light of volumes of legislative history and over four decades

76. Id. at 737-38 (emphasis added). The second sentence in the quote is redundant. The

"nonwaivable" character of a Title VII discrimination claim was described in the first sentence and

implicitly restated in the second sentence. However, the second sentence would be best viewed as

one providing the main reason for the "nonwaivable" nature of a Title VII claim: the inadequacy of
arbitration as a forum for the enforcement of Title VII rights. See id.; see also United States Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1971) (seaman can assert wage claim in federal
court under the Seamen's Wage Act even though he had not previously pursued arbitral remedies
provided by contract grievance procedures); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 357 U.S.
265, 268 (1958) (employee returning from military service need not pursue grievance and arbitration
procedure prior to asserting seniority rights in federal court under Universal Military Training and
Service Act).
77. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 737. See also McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292
(1984) (neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel effect should be given a labor arbitrators's award
in a section 1983 action in federal district court).
78. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 742-45.

79. Id. at 742.
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of legal interpretation and administrative rulings ....[A]rbitrators may
be competent to resolve preliminary factual questions" but are not
competent to decide ultimate legal issues.80
The complexity of the ADEA was not discussed in Gilmer. It
would have clarified the Supreme Court's analysis if its decision had
examined the statement of the Court of Appeals in Gilmer's' case that
ADEA claims "involve in the main simple, factual inquiries."'
Im.

POST GARDNER-DENVERIBARRENTiNE

A.

Arbitration's Resurrection

1. The Search For Distinctions
In the interim period between the Gardner-Denverand Barrentine
decisions and the Gilmer decision, what cured arbitration's status as an
inadequate forum for statutory discrimination claims? Certainly not that
race and age discrimination cases present materially different kinds of
statutory discrimination claims. For both age and race, Congress
addressed discrimination based on immutable traits, two of which are
permanent, one of which may be avoided only by death before the time
at which the governing statute becomes applicable.82 A hearing on one
kind of claim would generate complexities of roughly equal degree for
the decision maker. To the extent that differences in complexity might
exist, the age-discrimination dispute could offer greater difficulties for the
decision maker. Age-discrimination claims generally present greater
83 Justification is not
numbers of opportunities for justification defenses.
4
cases.
a valid defense in racial discrimination

80. Id. at 743.
81. Gilmer, 895 F.2d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 1990).
82. See 29 U.S.C §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
83. See, e.g., Iervolino v. Delta Airlines, 796 F.2d 1408 (1Ith Cir. 1986) (holding that in an
airline captain's ADEA suit, the airline's defense that 60 year age limitation for flight engineer
position was justified because it was a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
transportation of passengers); Baker v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 6 F.3d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding "[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that age was a determining factor in the
employment decision, the defendant-employer can rebut the prima facie case and/or assert any
number of affirmative defenses.').
84. See BARBARA LINDEMA ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (BNA) 302 (2d ed.

1983). "The bona fide occupational qualification defense is not available to charges of race or color
discrimination under Title VII," although the business-necessity doctrine might be offered in its
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Was Gilmer's prior agreement to arbitrate a valid basis on which to
distinguish Gardner-Denverand Barrentinefrom the Gilmer decision, as
the Supreme Court suggested in Gilmer? Hardly so, it seems. A prior
agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim, might, as a matter of contract
interpretation, embrace arbitration in a procedurally defective forum. But
the relative incompetence of arbitrators to resolve statutory claims, and
other arbitration procedure's deficiencies, bear not at all on the question
of how the agreement to arbitrate ought to be interpreted. Rather, they
go to the question of whether a statute, in Gilmer's case the ADEA,
impliedly disallows waiver of its statutory coverage in favor of relegation
to an arbitration forum, no matter how efficient its processes and how
process deficiencies might effectively derogate from substantive rights
provided by the legislature.
The ADEA's text contains nothing explicit on the enforceability of
agreements to waive a federal court forum in favor of arbitration.
However, the Supreme Court is sufficiently entranced with a federal
policy favoring arbitration to have turned around the accepted standard
that the burden of demonstrating waiver rests with the party alleging
waiver.8 ' Gilmer had the unequivocally expressed statutory right to
have his ADEA age discrimination complaint filed "in any court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate
the purposes of [the ADEA]. ' 86
This would seem to obligate the Supreme Court to delve deeply into
the question of whether arbitral procedural deficiencies and lack of
arbitrator expertise in employment matters generally, and statutory
discrimination claims in particular, made Gilmer's right to a judicial
forum nonwaivable. Surprisingly, though, the Court scarcely addressed
the issue.
Gilmer's intended arbitration forum became an abstract. What

place. Id.; see also Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (where the Court held in a Title VII claim that the facts underlying the
defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff, namely his lack of background in the field of psychometrics, the amount of time that he took at his work, and the significantly greater number of appeals
and corrections he prepared as opposed to those prepared by others in the Test Center, warranted
finding that the defendant's failure to promote was nondiscriminatory); Baker v. City of St.
Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1968) (where the court held that racial classifications cannot
be justified by a state on grounds that they were a "product of discretionary administrative
determination made in good faith and not of a desire to circumvent the equal protection clause.").
85. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that the
burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude waiver of

judicial remedies for statutory discrimination).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 13:2

should have been an inadequate-forum analysis was replaced by a
response to "generalized attacks on arbitration. ' ' 7 The straw argument
was easily toppled as one "far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
88
disputes."
2. -Out-of-Context Common Law
A reader of Gilmer might easily surmise that the "current strong
endorsement" of arbitration was a reference to post-Gardner-Denverand
Barrentinedecisions that weakened or at least modified the thrust of their
teachings. 9 But the statement was immediately followed by a citation
to Rodriguez de Qut/as v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.," where the
unique question of arbitrator competence to decide statutory claims was
not at issue.
Rodriguez de Quijas involved the enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate disputes between stock brokers and their customers. 9 The
Court's favorable comments about arbitration were general: Arbitration
was not so bad that courts would disfavor all kinds of arbitration - as
the common law once did by holding unenforceable all agreements to
arbitrate.92 The competence of securities industry arbitrators to interpret
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA"), 93 a statute regulating
the securities industry, was never questioned.
Putting aside their possible bias as individuals employed by the

87. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(the Supreme Court found that there is no reason to depart from the federal policy favoring
arbitration where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory

lights).
The liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements [citation omitted], manifested
by [the Federal Arbitration] Act as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the
enforcement of private contractual arrangements: the Act simply creates a body of federal
substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.
Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24

(1983)).
90. 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
91. Rodriguez de Quias, 490 U.S. at 478.
92. Id. at 480-81. In overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Court interpreted
section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act not to bar any waiver of its provisions, Rodriguez
de Quifas, 490 U.S. at 481-82. In Rodriguez de Quojas, the Court of Appeals had refused to follow
Wilko and was roundly criticized by the Supreme Court for taking the Court's exclusive prerogative
of overruling its decisions. Id. at 484.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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securities industry, the arbitrators were competent to interpret the rules
governing relations between brokers and their customers. 94 The
securities industry empowered the same arbitrators to decide employment
termination cases, including those involving statutory discrimination
claims-an area in which they were woefully lacking in expertise. 9
B.

The Federal Arbitration Act

The Supreme Court in Gilmer did not acknowledge important
differences between the kinds of arbitration available to claimants in the
cases it cited and Gilmer's intended arbitration.96 Rather, it relied on
the FAA of 19259' and its reversal of a "longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and
had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 8 That analysis,
though, contains a flaw common to many discussions of arbitration's
utility as a forum for statutory claims. 99 It broadly treats arbitration as
though all arbitration procedures, including methods of arbitrator
selection, means of arbitrator compensation, and the nature of the parties
using the process, are similar.'
The Supreme Court in Gilmer, not acknowledging that there is
arbitration and there is arbitration,answered no more than the question
whether Gilmer's action should have been dismissed on the basis of old
common law, which is now abrogated by the FAA, on the

94. See Rodriguez de Quias,490 U.S. at 481.
95. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 12.
96. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
97. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
98. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
99. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Divergent Strategies: Union Organization and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1994 LAB.L.J. 465, 468-69. Professor St. Antoine has written in
support of "private arbitration for the resolution of statutory disputes," without making distinctions
between the kinds of arbitration to which an employee might be relegated by pre-dispute contractual
agreement. Id. For support, he draws on equally generalized statements from judges. Id. The view
of one judge, Harry Edwards, now Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit, in guarded
support of statutory arbitration, is cited. Id. at 469 n.16; Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of
Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982-CONDuCT OF THE
HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

16, 27 (BNA 1983). A later article by Judge Edwards, expresses the utmost caution concerning the
arbitration of public law claims. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea
or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
100. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
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unenforceability of all agreements to arbitrate.' 0' Contrary to what the

Court's Gilmer analysis suggests, it simply does not follow from the
FAA-established proposition that arbitration agreements are no longer all
unenforceable, that all agreements to arbitrate are enforceable.
IV.

GILMER'S AND OTHER ARBITRATION FORUMS COMPARED

There are important differences between the securities industry
arbitration forum required for Mr. Gilmer and the labor arbitration
forum."°2 There are still other important differences between conventional commercial arbitration and Gilmer's required arbitration forum,
even though, as a non-labor arbitration forum it could have been
characterized as a commercial arbitration.0 3 Analysis of these differences generates a fair conclusion that for resolution of his statutory
discrimination claim, Gilmer's potential arbitration would have been
close to the worst of all possible existing arbitration worlds.
A.

The Mitusbishi and Gilmer Arbitration Forums

Also in support of its statements concerning a shift in judicial
thinking in favor of arbitration, the Gilmer court cited its decision104 in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.'0 5 There, the
Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising under

101. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27. Justices Stevens and Marshall dissented from the majority's
conclusion in favor of the FAA's applicability. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They read the
FAA as having excluded from its coverage arbitration agreements between employees and
employers. Id. at 40. Gilmer failed to raise the issue in any of the courts below or in his petition
for certiorari. Id. at 37-38. It was raised by several amici. Id. at 38. The majority nonetheless
determined that the FAA's exclusion clause was not applicable, because Gilmer's securities
registration application was not a contract with his employer, Interstate, but a contract with the
securities exchanges. Id. at 25.
102. See Megan L. Dunphy, MandatoryArbitration:StrippingSecuritiesIndustry Employees of
Their Civil Rights, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169, 1192 (1995) (author discusses the securities industry
arbitration and makes comparisons between other types of arbitration); Lynn Katzler, Note, Should
Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities Arbitrations?:The Practicaland Legal
Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 151, 197 (1995) (author distinguishes
labor arbitration forums from commercial arbitration).
103. See Walter Gershenfeld, New Roles ForLaborArbitrators: Will Arbitrators' Work Really
Be Different?, in ARBITRATION 1994: CONTROVERSY AND CONTINUITY (BNA) 275, 280 (1994),
"All [American Arbitration Association] programs other than labor (e.g., general commercial,
securities, construction, textile) are labelled commercial." Id.
104. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
105. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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American antitrust law."'6

The arbitration forum covered by the agreement was set up and
governed by the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.0t 7 The Supreme Court heralded the decision as one manifesting
the end of "judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals.. .. "log
The Gilmer court's reliance on Mitsubishi overlooked vital
distinctions between different kinds of arbitration processes.
In
Mitsubishi, unlike Gilmer, two corporate entities were able to negotiate
the terms of their arbitration agreement. 09 Gilmer had no such
opportunity. He was an individual opposing a corporation. He signed
a take-it-or-leave-it agreement in order to retain his job. 1
In the Mitsubishi case, both parties to the antitrust dispute were able

to join in the selection of their arbitrator."' Securities industry arbitration procedures provided no such opportunity for Gilmer. In the
arbitration to which he was relegated by the Supreme Court, Gilmer
would be forced to accept the securities industry arbitrators appointed by
the securities industry."2 In Gardner-Denver and Barrentine,arbitrator
competence, the grievant's standing as a non-party to the collective
bargaining agreement, and inadequate labor arbitration procedures, were

all factors in determining labor arbitration's inadequacy as a forum for
statutory claims."' Only different bases for concluding in favor of
arbitration's inadequacy existed in the Gilmer case." 4 Suppose Robert

106. Id. at 629.
107. Id. at 617.

108. Id. at 626-27. But see Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public
Interest. The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 264-65 (1987) (where the author

criticizes the Mitsubishi decision).
109. Id. at 617.
110. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
111. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE JAPAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, RULE 16. Other provisions in the rules permit the parties jointly to select the number

of arbitrators who will hear their case (Rules 17, 19), the venue for the arbitration hearing (Rule 14),
and allow a party to request that the arbitrator'sneutrality be "neutral" (Rule 20).
112. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2607-08, at 4314-15 (Rules 607 and 608) (1995). But see
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2609, at 4315-16 (Rule 609) (1995) (Rule provides that each party "shall
have the right to one peremptory challenge ....
").
113. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 742-45; Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 56-60.
114. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35. Most analyses of Gilmer accept the Gilmer Court's reasoning
that the Mitsubishidecision supports the Gilmer decision. Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision
and the PrivateArbitration of Public-LawDisputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 649. Antitrust law
is complex and the Court in Mitsubishi did not find its complexities a basis for refusing to enforce
the agreement to arbitrate.. Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 632-33. Like the Court, most commentators do
not compare the kind of arbitration agreement involved in the Mitsubishidecision with the arbitration
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Gilmer had been able to take his case to a labor arbitration forum.
B.

A Gilmer Labor Arbitration

1. The Rise of Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitration is exclusively a forum for resolving disputes over
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.'

Though

arbitration was well established in a few industries before World War II,
its institutionalized use for individual grievances began in the United
States with the War Labor Board's ("WLB") efforts during Word War
116
II to minimize strikes that could interfere with the war effort.
The WLB's caseload was large enough to require that it devise

some voluntary dispute-resolution mechanism for wage and other
disputes in industries essential to the war effort." 7 Grievance arbitra-

tion was an obvious solution."' The WLB encouraged it by advocating for voluntary arbitration." 9 It made Board staff members available
as arbitrators.'
It ordered the inclusion of grievance-arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements.'
As a result of successful War Labor Board experiences with

arbitration, the resolution of employment grievances by arbitrators began
to proliferate after World War II."

arbitration acceptable.'

Employers and unions found

Unions liked it because it avoided the

intended for Gilmer. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford & Michael J. Evers, The InteractionBetween The
Employment-At-Will Doctrine and Employer-Employee Agreements To Arbitrate Statutory Fair
Employment PracticesClaims: Dijficult Choices ForAt-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443, 45056 (1995).
115. See EDWIN E. WrrTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION 1 (1952).
116. See id. at 56-58; Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 564-69 (1983).
117. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 567-68.
118. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 567-68.
119. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 568-69.
120. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 570.
121. See, e.g., In reWalker Turner Co., Inc., 1 War Lab. Rep. 101 (1942) (where the Board held
that in a dispute between a union and a company which have never had a mutually acceptable
procedure for the settlement of grievances, the collective bargaining agreement should provide that
grievances be submitted to a committee); In re Champlin Refining Co., 3 War Lab. Rep. 155 (1942)
(the Board ordered an arbitration clause written into the collective bargaining agreement).
122. See WrrrE, supra note 115, at 44-45.
123. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 623; see also Robben Fleming, The Labor
Arbitration Process:1943-1963, 52 KY. L.J. 817, 817 (1963).
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judiciary and its then history of hostility towards union interests. 24
Employers tolerated it because the exchange for the grievance-arbitration
clause was a no-strike clause.'25
In addition, the remedies awarded by labor arbitrators were
relatively minor and remain so today. An employee who is discharged
and whose union wins a termination grievance in arbitration obtains no
more than reinstatement and a make-whole order, no matter what
motivated the discharge. 126 Back pay27with interim earnings deducted
1
and no punitive damages is the norm.
Punitive damages, however, were and remain today virtually
unheard of in the labor arbitration forum. 128 Among labor arbitrators,
the question of whether an arbitrator may award interest on back pay is
still controversial and thought by many arbitrators to be beyond what
parties to collective bargaining agreements contemplated. 29
Early in its history, grievance-arbitration was swift, though that is
no longer true. 30 On average, a union-represented employee who files
a grievance and takes it to arbitration will not receive a final decision
from the arbitrator for about a year.'

124. See, e.g., Calvert McGruder, Note, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the
Development of Collective Bargaining,50 HAkV.L. REv. 1071, 1112-13 (1937).
125. See id. at 1113.
126. See ELKOUI & ELKOURI, supranote 60, at 688.
127. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 60, at 688.
128. See Jordan L. Resnick, Note, Beyond Mastrobuono: A Practitioners'Guide to Arbitration,
Employment Disputes, Punitive Damages, and the Implication of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 931 (1995) (noting that many states hold punitive damage awards by
arbitrators to be against public policy).
129. See, e.g., GTE North, Inc and Communications Workers of America, 102 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
154, 160 (1993) (Kenis, Arb.) (absence of "contractual authorization"); Board of Trustees of Univ.
of Ill., 100 Lab. Arb (BNA) 728 (1992) (Goldstein, Arb.) (not even where there are several years
of delay before a finding and a remedy order). Some labor arbitrators deny requests for interest on
backpay on the somewhat dubious ground that interest on backpay is punitive and not remedial. See,
e.g., Builders Plumbing Supply, 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 344 (1990) (Briggs, Arb.) (company did not
maliciously and intentionally violate the collective bargaining agreement); City of Bridgeport, 94
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 975, 978 (1990) (Fitch, Arb.) ("arbitration is not a punitive proceeding... it is
restorative"). See generally David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor
Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 18 (Sept. 1993). Small numbers of arbitrators award interest, but only if it
is requested as part of the remedy. The rationale is that the NLRB routinely awards interest on back
pay; interest on backpay is a make-whole remedy, and that collective bargaining agreements are
seldom specific on any aspect of an arbitrator's remedial authority. See, e.g., WJA Realty, Inc., 97
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1991) (Haemmel, Arb.); Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, 89 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 841 (1987) (Alleyne, Arb.); Dayco Products, Inc., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 876, 882 (1989)
(Fowler, Arb.) ("equitable" to award interest).
130. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 116, at 623.
131. The average time between the filing of a grievance and a labor arbitrator's decision is 385
days. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Arbitration Statistics, Fiscal Year 1994. Most
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Processing the case to the arbitration step and setting up the hearing
are what take up most of that time.1 32 Only a small portion of it is
used for the hearing and for the arbitrator to write a decision.13 Most
arbitrators selected through the procedures of arbitrator appointing
agencies comply with the thirty to sixty day decision-writing recommendations of the appointing agency.134 Arbitrators are less inclined to
delay decisions in cases involving an appointing agency like the AAA or
FMCS.135 Each may remove from its roster of arbitrators, an arbitrator
with an unsatisfactory decision-writing time record. Labor arbitrators
who are selected directly by the parties can be less constrained to delay
36
decisions.
In 1987 a National Academy of Arbitrators Special Committee On
Professionalism, composed entirely of past NAA presidents, commented
on long delays in arbitrator decision-writing:

of that time precedes the arbitration hearing and is used by parties to implement the grievancearbitration process up to but not including the time of the hearing. Labor arbitration proceedings
are taking, on average, 76.87 days between the time the hearing is closed to the time of the
arbitrator's award. Id. The time spans noted by the FMCS are the following:
AVERAGE DAYS DURATION (BASED ON SAMPLED AWARDS)
Between grievance filed/panel request
104.20
Between panel request/panel sent
3.44
Between panel sent/appointment
60.31
Between appointment/hearing
98.06
Between panel request/award
222.22
Between hearing/final brief
44.95
Between hearingaward
76.87
FMCS Rules encourage the completion of an arbitrator's decision within 60 days afier the close of
the hearing, "unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties or specified by law." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1404.15(a) (1995). For purposes of FMCS record keeping, close of the hearing is not the last day
of hearing but the time when the record is closed, or in other words, when the briefs are filed. Id.
Arbitration proceedings conducted through the offices of FMCS and the American Arbitration
Association at least have the advantage of providing for the arbitrator an incentive to complete the
award in a reasonable time rather than risk removal from their rosters of arbitrators. Id.
§ 1404.15(b). For what is known as the "ad hoc" selection of arbitrator--those made without an
intervening appointing agency-the delay problem is a more serious one, not so much for average
decision writing times, which tend to be indeterminate because of the absence of a record keeping
appointing agency. Rather, it is the extraordinary length of time some arbitrators have taken to
complete an opinion. See James L. Hill & Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Rush to Unfairness: The
Downside of ADR, 28 JuDGEs J. 8, 11 (1989) (citing a 1987 study by the Committee on
Professionalism of the National Academy of Arbitrators noting decisions taking months, sometimes
years to decide).
132. See supra note 131.
133. See supra note 131.
134. Roger I. Abrams et al., Arbitral Therapy, 46 RuTGERS L. REv. 1751, 1771 (1994).
135. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOIRi, supra note 60, at 276-78.
136. See ELKOuRi & ELKOUPR,
supra note 60, at 276-78.; 29 C.F.R. § 1405(d)(2) (1995).
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Some arbitrators have been responsible for long delays in issuing
awards. They keep the parties waiting many months, sometimes a year
or more. They think nothing of asking helpless parties for extensions
or simply holding pending cases without even requesting an extension.
Worse still, some fail to adjust their own work schedules so that pastdue awards and future awards will be rendered in a timely fashion. All
of this is clearly inconsistent with professional responsibilities stated in
the Code [of professional responsibility].'

From the beginning, employers found labor arbitration agreements
acceptable because of the reciprocal union promise not to strike during

the life of the collective bargaining agreement. 3

The mutually

attractive qualities of labor arbitration were such that it survived the end
of a war-time need for the uninterrupted production of goods.'3 9
At first the post-war arbitrators were mainly individuals who served
only occasionally in that capacity. They were full time professors,

and as the
clergymen, and lawyers, among other occupations,'
number of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements began
to rise, increasing numbers of individuals found arbitration opportunities
sufficiently numerous to provide full-time arbitration work.

Inevitably, an organization of arbitrators, the National Academy of
Arbitrators ("NA.A") was founded in 1947,'4' primarily in response to
criticism that arbitration awards were being made by unethical persons
on a "now-it's-your-turn-basis.',142 The NAA had as its objective the
education and training of arbitrators and the fostering of standards of
professional responsibility. 43
Applicants for NAA membership are required to meet admissions
standards based exclusively on acceptability as a labor arbitrator' 44 and

137. REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONALISM OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 106, El (June 4, 1987).
138. See McGruder, supra note 124, at 1113.
139. See Nolan & Abrams, supranote 116, at 629.
140. See ELKOURI & ELKOUmI, supra note 60, at 138.
141. ELKORI & ELKOU1U, supra note 60, at 21.
142. See Kirby Behre, Arbitration:A Permissibleor Desirable Methodfor Resolving Disputes
Involving FederalAcquisitionandAssistanceContracts?, 16 PuB. CONT. L.J. 66,72 (1986); Richard
E. Speidel, Arbitration and Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Case for
Reform, 4 OIto ST. L.J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 157, 191 (1989).
143. See Dallas L. Jones, PresidentialAddress: The Educational Role of the Academy, in
ARBITRATION 1994 CoNTROvERsY AND CONTINUITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF ARBITRATORS (BNA) 1, 1 (1994).
144. The NAA "Statement of Policy Relative to Membership," contained in the NAA
membership directory, notes "general acceptability by the parties" as the single substantive criterion
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compliance with the NAA's Code of Professional responsibility 45
Mutual selection of the labor arbitrator has the key attribute of powerfully dictating who becomes a labor arbitrator, who remains a labor arbitrator, and where a labor arbitrator ranks on success scales. 4 6 "Accept-

ability" is also a criterion for inclusion on American Arbitration
Association 47 48and Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service rosters
of arbitrators. 1
The "acceptability" requirement poses a classic Catch-22 dilemma
for the prospective labor arbitrator who must find a way to become
acceptable while lacking the experience to be acceptable. It creates a

nearly equal Catch-22 dilemma for the threshold full-time labor arbitrator
who has heard a small number of cases but an insufficient number to
assure a full-time arbitration career. The nearly exclusive criterion of

acceptability as the measure of a labor arbitrator's perceived value poses
an ethical dilemma for the arbitrator. It is reflected in a provision of the

Code of Professional Responsibility for labor arbitrators:
An arbitrator must be as ready to rule for one party as for the other on
each issue, either in a single case or in a group of cases. Compromise

for membership. The single remaining criterion for membership requires that the applicant "be of
good moral character, as demonstrated by adherence to sound ethical standards in professional
activities." Id. The Academy's Membership Committee has interpreted the statement on
membership to mean five years of arbitration experience and a minimum of 50 awards. See REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REvIEw MEMBERSHIP AND RELATED POLICY QUESTIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 367, 370
03NA 1976). See also James J. Sherman, The NAA: Lookingfor a Few Good Arbitrators,50 DISP
RESOL. J. 82 (Jan. 1995) (basic standard is "general acceptance of the parties"). The NAA's heavy
focus on acceptability has been criticized by an NAA committee composed entirely of past NAA
presidents. See Report of The Special Committee On Professionalism, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 221, 224 (BNA 1988)
("competence as a criterion for admission is secondary to acceptability.").
145. See NAA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEmENT DISPUTES (1975) (amended 1985) (whose Preamble states that
faithful adherence by an arbitrator to this Code is basic to professional responsibility.
The National Academy of Arbitrators will expect its members to be governed in their
professional conduct by this Code and stands ready, through its Committee on Ethics and
Grievances, to advise its members as to the Code's interpretation).
146. See generally Steven S. Briggs & John C. Anderson, An Empirical Investigation of
ArbitratorAcceptability, 19 INDUS. REL. L. 163 (1980).
147. See generally COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 13 (An. Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.4(f) (1995). The standards for appointment to the FMCS roster of
arbitrators are "background and experience, availability, acceptability, geographical location and the
expressed preferences of the parties." Id. (emphasis added). Unacceptability may be based on the
number of times the arbitrator's name has been proposed and the number of times he or she has been
accepted. Id. § 1404.5(a)(5) (1995).
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by an arbitrator for the sake of attempting to achieve personal
acceptability is unprofessional.'49
As a past president of the National Academy of Arbitrators has argued,
and as the quoted Code provision warns against, labor arbitrator selfinterest in becoming or remaining acceptable has the potential to
influence the labor arbitrator's case analysis.'
The problem could easily be exacerbated in a forum for the
resolution of statutory discrimination claims. There, the temptation to
please the employer would likely be heightened for distinct reasons. As
in Gilmer,the employer alone will have sometimes created the arbitration
panel. Even if the panel is the creation of a neutral agency like the
American Arbitration Association, the employer would be the single
party to use the arbitration process on an ongoing basis and, consequently, the only party to regularly track arbitration results. However, in labor
arbitration, the arbitration parties are both entities. Both have institutionalized the process of tracking arbitration results and arbitrators.
Disputes heard by labor arbitrators cover a range of contractinterpretation issues. Overtime pay, seniority, discipline, and work
assignments make up the bulk of the labor arbitrator's caseload. In 1986
labor arbitrators heard about 65,000 employee grievances, with ten
percent of the arbitrators having decided approximately fifty percent of
those cases.' 5'
Apart from an occasional contract-interpretation dispute having a
parallel in statutory law, the kinds of disputes heard by labor arbitrators
in private sector cases are not those ordinarily decided by judges. Even

149. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES, art. I § A(2), at 315, reprintedin CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (BNA) (Rena
A. Gorlin ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. The National
Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, and the National Mediation Board are signatory to the Code. Id. at 314. It
was originally approved in 1951 and later substantially revised in 1974. Id. at 313.

150. Richard Mittenthal, Self-Interest: Arbitration's Unmentionable Consideration?,49 DISP.
RESOL. J. 70, 70 (Mar. 1994). See also Paul R. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE
L.J. 1019 (1965) (where the author argues that a "system of adjudication in which the judge depends
for his livelihood, or for a substantial part of his livelihood or even substantial supplements [to] his
regular income, or pleasing those who hire him to judge, is per se a thoroughly undesirable

system."). But see Saul Wallen, Arbitratorsand Judges-Dispellingthe Hays' Haze, in SOUTHERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE OF LABOR LAW 159 (1962).
151. See generally LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA: THE PROFESSION AND PRACTICE 95-96
(Bognano and Coleman eds., 1992); see generally ELKOURI & ELKOUIJ,supranote 60, at 96 (noting
that labor arbitration tends to be considered "an all purpose tool or panacea for the resolution of any
and all disputes which the parties fail to settle privately.").
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without the nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial hostility

toward unions, arbitration would have been an essential part of collective
bargaining. Judges were and remain generally unfamiliar with the
contents of collective bargaining agreements. They contain matters over
which American courts have rarely exercised any kind of jurisdiction.
Labor arbitrators in private sector cases rarely interpret statutes of

any kind. The Supreme Court has cautioned them that it would not be
appropriate to do so in disputes over the meaning of collective bargaining

agreements. 52 A study commissioned by the Research Committee of
the National Academy of Arbitrators and conducted by two academics

with arbitration experience, found that, "[labor] arbitrators who were
active in 1987 were elderly, white, non-hispanic men."'5
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.s was decided with an ostensi-

bly odd mixture of praise and criticism of labor arbitration. All of its
qualities, including that of speed and informality, were viewed negatively
in the context of disputes over the meaning of a discrimination statute
enacted by Congress.' 55 That is the only explanation for what might
otherwise appear in the Gardner-Denver case to be conflicting assess-

ments of labor arbitration. In addition, still other characteristics of the
union-management relationship made Gilmer's securities industry

arbitration forum and Alexander's labor arbitration forum quite different
from each other.

152. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Public sector arbitration decisions are of a
different order. They often incorporate statutes and regulations which, in turn, require their interpretation by arbitrators in a manner consistent with judicial interpretation. For example, the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 [hereinafter CSRA], authorizes and regulates federal government
collective bargaining. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). This Act makes every federal
sector collective bargaining agreement subject to all federal laws and rules and regulations. Id.
§ 7117(a).
153. Charles J. Coleman & Perry A. Zirkel, The Varied Portraitsof the Labor Arbitrator,in
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 21, 25 (Mario F. Bognanno & Charles J. Coleman, eds. 1992).
Previous studies noted by the authors, and whose conclusions were generally confirmed by them,
included the following: Edgar L. Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 200 (1951) (partial study of arbitrator caseloads); Robert Coulson, Spring
Checkup on Labor Arbitration Procedure, 16 LAB. L.J. 259 (1965); James F. Power, Improving
Arbitration:Roles of Partiesand Agencies, 95 MONTHLY LAB. RE'v. 15 (1972); Steven Briggs &
John C. Anderson, An EmpiricalInvestigationof ArbitratorAcceptability, 19 INDUS. REL. L.J. 163
(1980); Paul Zirkel, A Profile of GrievanceArbitration Cases, 38 ARB. J.35 (1983); Brain L. King,
Some Aspects of the Active Labor Arbitrator,50 PERSONNEL J. 115 (1971).
154. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
155. Id. at 56-58.
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2. The Fall of Labor Arbitration
The percentage of American private sector workers represented by
unions had fallen from a high of about 35% percent in 1954 to 11.2% in
1993.156 Some economists predict a continuing union representation
decline to around 5% by the year 2000.' With this dramatic change
in union fortunes, the number of grievances advancing to the final
grievance-arbitration step of arbitration also began to decline. 5 Work
opportunities for full-time and regular part-time arbitrators fell as a
result.' 59
Partially in response to the decline in available labor arbitration
work, many arbitrators who have worked exclusively as labor arbitrators
have begun to expand their practices to include commercial arbitration
and employment arbitration not involving unions. 16 As labor arbitra156. Theodore I. St. Antoine, DivergentStrategies: Union Organizingand Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1994 LAB. L.J. 465, 465. The percentage of public sector unionized employees rose
from zero to 49.8% between 1960 and 1976. Id. Professor St. Antoine points out that there is little
opposition to public sector union organizing drives, suggesting that employer coercion of private
sector union organizing efforts explains in substantial part the differences between union
representation rates in the two sectors. Id. The implicit conclusion is that private sector
representation rates would increase if coercive opposition to private sector union organizing drives
could be halted. Id. at 465-66. The difference between private and public sector rates of opposition
to union organizing drives can probably best be explained by the public sector's absence of a private
sector-type profit-motive base of operation. Id. at 468-70. With that, the prospects for a coercionfree union organizing environment in the private sector probably remain poor. Id. Consequently,
it is doubtful that amount of labor arbitration work available will swing upward in the foreseeable
future. Id. at 469-70.
157. Selwyn Feinstein, A Special News Report on People and TheirJobs in Offices, Fields and
Factories,WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1990, at Al.
158. See Mario F. Bognanno & Charles J Coleman, The NAA Study: Summation and
Conclusions, in LABOR ARBITRAnON IN AMERICA 159 (1992).
159. Id.
160. With this trend, some arbitrators who began and maintained their arbitration careers as labor
arbitrators have begun to list themselves in various alternative dispute resolution directories under
both the headings "Commercial" and "Employment" arbitration. Labor arbitrators widely perceive
that they are not acceptable to employers for non-union employment termination cases because of
an employer perception that they would use collective bargaining agreement "just-cause" standards
to resolve them. As a counter, some labor arbitrators downplay their backgrounds as labor
arbitrators. For example, a prominent labor arbitrator's listing in both the "Commercial" and
"Employment" sections of the ADR Southern California Source Book, published by the Los Angeles
County Bar Association reads:
Full-time Neutral in ADR; Adj Prof of Law..teach ADR; Lawyer, Solo Practice since
1976; Acted as neutral in more than 4,000 matters since 1969; Commercial, Employment,
Education, Entertainment, International & Transportation ...
Fees: $250/hr + expenses; per diem in some cases.
The perception that employers in non-union wrongful termination cases are reluctant to select
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tion opportunities decline, employment arbitration opportunities, namely,
those not involving unions, are on the rise. As a result of these trends,
it is at least likely that the arbitraiors for significant numbers of
arbitration cases heard under compelled agreements to arbitrate will be
.those from labor arbitrator ranks. This would include both labor
arbitrators on panels unilaterally appointed by employers and the
selection of labor arbitrators from employment and commercial
arbitration panels maintained by arbitrator appointing agencies.
C.

Controlling The Arbitration Process

Unlike Gardner-Denver, the Gilmer case involved no union, no
collective bargaining agreement and no preceding use of arbitration of
any kind.16 1 In a Gilmer hypothetical labor arbitration, collusion
possibilities of the kind hinted at in the Supreme Court's GardnerDenver decision 62 could be discounted as a basis for deeming Gilmer's
securities industry arbitration forum inadequate for his age discrimination
claim.
The kinds of workplace racial and sex-based divisions that might set
the stage for union-employer collusion would not likely be present. For
an age-discrimination grievance, the entire workforce can muse: "There
but for the grace of God go I", or "There but for the grace of God and
the passage of time go L" The employer-union collusion possibility in
statutory discrimination case contexts is why the Supreme Court's
Gardner-Denverdecision survives its Gilmer decision.
Gilmer distin163
guishes but does not overrule Gardner-Denver.
In Gardner-Denver,grievant Alexander could not have taken his
case to the final arbitration step of the governing grievance-arbitration

arbitrators with labor arbitration experience is countered by the views of at least two American

Arbitration Association officials. Richard M. Reilly, Senior Vice President, Education and Training,
and David Weinberg, Labor Case Administrator, San Francisco Regional Office, both told this author
that about half the non-union case employers they encounter avoid labor arbitrators because of their

experience with just cause standards; that half seek the services of labor arbitrators for such cases
because labor arbitrators are unlikely to award punitive damages. Punitive damages in labor
arbitration are almost nonexistent. Interest on backpay is usually denied. It may be that the one-half
of employers willing or perhaps eager to engage labor arbitrators for wrongful termination cases is

offset by the reluctance of plaintiffs' attorneys in non-union employment termination cases to select
a labor arbitrator from a class of arbitrators still arguing over the propriety of awarding interest on
back pay.
161. See 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
162. Alexander v Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
163. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
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process because that right was reserved to his union-subject to its
obligation not to be invidiously arbitrary or discriminatory in making that
decision."6 Gilmer, as an individual claimant, would have had no such
165
concern had he used the securities industry arbitration processes.
Nor could Alexander alone, unlike Gilmer in his hypothetical securities
industry arbitration, have sought to vacate an adverse arbitration award.
As is common in labor arbitration, the proceedings before, during,
and after the hearing, are structured by the union and employer parties.
For example, they strategize 66 , choose counsel, 67 and decide whether the hearing proceedings will be transcribed. 68 A civil or criminal
case litigant who is dissatisfied with retained counsel can discharge
counsel, but a labor-arbitration grievant may not discharge the union's
attorney and would have enormous difficulties using individual counsel
for the arbitration proceedings without the union's consent.' 69 Gilmer,
in contrast, could have retained counsel of choice for his securities
industry arbitration and maintained control over strategy and tactics,
albeit within the limited confines of the securities industry arbitration
rules. 7 °
1. Distinct Arbitrator Pools
Most of the arbitrators available to Gilmer, like the demographic
were "white
characteristics of their labor arbitrator counterparts,'
males averaging sixty years of age."' 72 Unlike labor arbitrators, they

164. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 39-42; see also Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) (agreement discriminating against black members of bargaining unit violates the union's
duty of fair representation); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.RtB. 181 (1962), enf denied,326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963) (union instigation of employer action against an employee is unlawful); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967) (union breaches duty where its conduct toward members is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith.'). See generally THE DUTY OF FAIR REPREsENTATION (Jean T.
McKelvey ed., 1977).

165. See N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCII)

2600-2638, at 4311-30 (1995).

166. See ELKOURI & ELKOuRI, supra note 60, at 237-40.
167. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 241-42.
168. ELKOURI & ELKOuRI, supra note 60, at 258-62.

169. See Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 58 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 1995) (union may bar
employee from consulting with attorney other than union attorneys).
2600-2638, at 4311-30 (1995).
170. See N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
171. See Coleman & Zirkel, supra note 154, at 25-26.

172. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 8. Using 48% of the NYSE pool, or 349 arbitrators,
97% were found to be white, 0.9% black, 0.6% Asian, and 1%other. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note
25, at 8. The average age for men was 60, for women 49 (age information represented 85% of the
NYSE pool). G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 8. The characteristics of the National Association
of Securities Dealers pool generally resembled those of the NYSE pool. G.A.O. REPORT, supranote
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had little or no experience with employment law problems generally, and
were particularly lacking in experience with statutory discrimination
cases. 73 For Gilmer, they would have had the daunting task of
interpreting the often not easily applied substantive provisions of the
ADEA 74 Labor arbitrators were noted in Gardner-Denver and

Barrentine to lack statutory-discrimination expertise and Fair Labor
Standards expertise, respectively. 1" However, labor arbitrators work
regularly with employment termination grievances over the meaning of
clauses limiting discharge to those with "just cause."'17 6 Formally,

securities industry arbitrators available to Gilmer should have been
"knowledgeable in the area of controversy,"' 7 7 but in practice the
selection standard was not whether the arbitrator had "expertise
appropriate to the type of dispute being decided."' 17 8 Rather, it was
whether the arbitrator could determine the facts of a dispute 7 9

2. Distinct Arbitrator Selection Processes And Costs
In a collective bargaining setting, Gilmer's union and his former

25, at 9.
173. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 7. "Between August 1990 and December 1992,
NASD's New York office and NYSE decided few employment discrimination cases." G.A.O.
REPORT, supra note 25, at 7. During 1991 and 1992, NYSE arbitrated 1,110 cases; 798 were
customer-firm cases, 312 were employment cases, and of the 312, only 16 were employment
discrimifiation cases. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 7.
174. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994); see also Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (overturning district court's holding that an older worker's higher salary
is a nondiscriminatory reason for replacing him, but with a dissent opining that more highly-paid
older workers are genuinely less cost-effective and that termination on that basis should be
permissible under the ADEA); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451
U.S. 945 (1981) (striking down, based on disparate impact, a school administration policy of
restricting new employment to teachers with less than five years of experience); Paolillo v. Dresser
Industries, Inc., 813 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1987) (offer of early retirement establishes prima facie case
of age discrimination); Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987) (offer of
early retirement violates ADEA only when surrounding conditions rise to level of constructive
discharge).
175. See supra notes 39-81 and accompanying text.
176. See Basic Patterns:Discharge,Discipline and Resignation, 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAININO
NEGOT. AND CONT. (BNA) No. 1035, at 40:1 (Mar. 2, 1995). "'Cause' or 'just cause' is stated as
a reason for discharge in 92% of agreements studied - 95% in manufacturing and 88% in nonmanufacturing." Id.
177. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 12.
178. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 12.
179. G.A.O. REPORT, supranote 25, at 12. The report suggests that "it may be appropriate to
consider whether the panels for these [discrimination] cases should be comprised differently, and
include at least one arbitrator with expertise in employment or discrimination law." G.A.O. REPORT,
supra note 25, at 12.
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employer would mutually have selected the arbitrator for his age
discrimination grievance."'0 Mutual arbitrator selection provides for each

arbitration party what amounts to a veto power over the other's choice
of arbitrator.'
Gilmer would have had no opportunity to veto the industry's choice

of any arbitrator. The industry unilaterally selected all arbitrators for its
pool of arbitrators," s and decided unilaterally which arbitrators from the
arbitration pool would hear individual cases."8 3 The claimant receives a
copy of the arbitrators' profiles, and both sides were entitled to exercise
one peremptory challenge." 4
The GAO report, however, makes no recommendation for changing
the unilateral securities industry arbitrator selection process. Had Gilmer
possessed mutual arbitrator pool and individual case selection authority
with the industry, he could have then considered, in determining how to
exercise it, potential arbitrators' expertise or lack of it in the substantive
law of age discrimination. Additionally, Gilmer would have been able

180. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 135-36. Labor arbitrators are selected from
either a list of about seven arbitrators provided by the American Arbitration Association [hereinafter
AAA], the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service [hereinafter FMCS], or other sources,
depending upon language in the grievance-arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
Or, the arbitrator's selection might be the result of negotiations between Gilmer's employer and his
union, without the use of a provided list of arbitrators. Still another frequent but less common labor
arbitrator selection procedure is for the employer and union to negotiate into the agreement the
names of several arbitrators who would hear cases on a rotating basis. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA
A. ELKOURi, How ARBITRATION WORKS (BNA) 68-69 (3d ed. 1973).
181. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 135-36.
182. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 8. Responding to the G.A.O. Report, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission only comments on the report's statements concerning arbitrator
selection was that "[t]he staff agrees with the draft [GAO] report that distinct procedures for
appointing arbitrators in discrimination cases and expanded arbitrator training in discrimination law
merit serious consideration." See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 25, 28 (providing the text of
a December 30, 1993 letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Director, SEC). The letter concedes,
barely, that "[it may be, however, that the employment law issues raised in discrimination cases are
sufficiently different from the SROs to develop additional training in discrimination law issues."
G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 28.
183. See G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 5. Industry officials decide informally on a case-bycase basis whether an applicant is qualified for the arbitration panel, using as criteria whether the
applicant has the required educational background, work experience, knowledge and relation to the
securities industry. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 5. Two letters of recommendation are
required. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 5. Individuals unilaterally selected for the securities
industry arbitration pool are classified as "industry" or "public" arbitrators. G.A.O. REPORT, supra
note 25, at 5. Industry arbitrators are those affiliated with a securities firm or are retirees from the
industry or "attorneys, accountants, or other professionals who have devoted 20[%] or more of their
professional work to securities industry clients within the last [two] years." G.A.O. REPORT, supra
note 25, at 5-6.
184. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
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to consider possible arbitrator bias and general arbitrator competence.

In this hypothetical labor arbitration, Gilmer's union, not Gilmer
himself, would have paid a share of the arbitrator's fee. 85 In a securities

industry arbitration for Gilmer, he might have paid substantial arbitration
forum fees in addition to paying his attorney's fees.18 6 Labor arbitrators
and conventional commercial arbitrators are ordinarily paid by parties
who share the arbitrators' fees. 187 In employment arbitration outside the
188
union sector, employers sometimes pay all of the arbitrator's fees.
Conventional commercial arbitrators and rent-a-judge judges all charge

much higher per diem fees then do labor arbitrators, who must be
sensitive to the abilities of unions to afford labor arbitration. 189

In nonunion employment arbitration, employees face Hobson-like
consequences. Either the claimant adds to already incurred lawyer fees
the payment of a share of the arbitrator's fee, or the claimant must suffer
the disheartening possibility of taking a claim to an arbitrator who is

compensated by the employer against whom the claim has been filed.
Both scenarios present profound difficulties for the integrity of the
arbitration proceedings. An arbitrator compensated wholly or mainly by
the employer will convey the appearance of possible bias in favor of the
party who pays the arbitrator's fees or wages. An arbitrator who is

scheduled to be paid in part by the individual claimant may not be paid.
To avoid that possibility, in cases with an individual, as distinguished from a corporate party claimant, arbitrators may demand fees in

185. See generally 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2629, at 4323-25 (Rule 629) (1995).
186. See New York Stock Exchange arbitration decision in Barbara A. Wolfe v. Charles R.
Schwab, NYSE Arbitration Docket No. 1993-003197 (Aug. 19, 1994), where claimant pursued an
unsuccessful sex discrimination allegation and was assessed one-half of $82,800 in "forum fees" for
55 hearing sessions and one discovery conference.
187. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 57 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
188. See, e.g., In re Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 728 (1992)
(Goldstein, Arb.).
189. The almost uniform fees received by judges employed by Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services [hereinafter JAMS] for private rent-a-judging is $400 per hour. See Kathleen
Sampson,Exploring The IssuesIn PrivateJudging,77 J. AMER. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 203, 205 (Jan.Feb. 1993). Average labor arbitration fees are $500.00 per day. Commercial arbitration fees vary
widely, but under the rules of the American'Arbitration Association, arbitrators hearing commercial
cases are not paid for the first day of hearing and are not paid for decision-writing time if hearing
time is not more than one day. COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 50 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n
1993). See also Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side ofAlternativeDisputeResolution, CALIF. LAWV.,
Feb. 1994, at 53. "Justman cites one recent arbitration that produced a $15,000 award and $6,000
in attorneys fees for a homebuyer, but was more than offset by a $30,000 legal bill and $9,000 for
the arbitrator's services." Id. at 56. "'How can this be cheaper?' Justman asks, 'When you go to
trial, you don't have to pay for the judge."' Id.
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advance of the arbitration."' This is not only to assure that the
arbitrator will receive the claimant's share of the arbitration fee from a
disgruntled claimant who has lost and is unwilling to pay. An up-front
payment requirement also assures that the arbitrator will be fully
compensated if the claimant, as a result of losing the arbitration is unable
to pay from funds the claimant anticipated receiving as part of a winning
award. The Gilmer decision permits this unseemly scenario.
3.

Discovery Procedures

A labor arbitrator is usually authorized to issue court-enforceable
subpoenas for the production of documents and to compel the appearance
of witnesses. 9 ' Beyond the issuance of subpoenas, labor arbitration
discovery is almost nonexistent. 92 Depositions, for example, are rarely
taken. Securities industry rule 637(c) provides that "Pre-Arbitration
discovery is generally more limited than and different from court
proceedings."' 93 The arbitrator may direct the appearance of anyone
employed by or associated with any "member or member organization
of the New York Stock Exchange . . .," but must do so "without resort
to the subpoena process.
,,94 thus placing the judicial enforcement
of a subpoena outside the rule's coverage. The rules are silent on the
authority of an arbitration party to take depositions.
4.

Opinion Writing

Gilmer's securities industry arbitrator would have been under no
obligation to write an opinion explaining the basis for a written
award.' 9 Labor arbitrators are under no legal obligation to write
opinions.' 96 Collective bargaining agreements almost never mention

190. See COMMERCIAL ARBTrrATION RULES, Rule 51 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993).
191. See generally Timothy J. Heinsz et al., The Subpoena Power of Labor Arbitrators, 1979
UTAH L. REv. 29, 48-55. However, it is generally accepted that unless authorized by statute or by
the agreement, the arbitrator has no subpoena power. ELKOURI & ELKOUI, supra note 60, at 305-

06.
192. Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment
and Call For Dialogue, 10 OHiO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343, 371-72 (1995).
193. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) $ 2636, at 4328 (Rule 636(a)(6)) (1995).
194. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCII) 2619, at 4321 (Rule 619(g)) (1995).
195. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
196. Id. The Court supported narrow review of labor arbitration awards on the ground, among

others, that "to require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no
supporting opinions." Id.
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a requirement that arbitrators write opinions.' 97 But Gilmer's hypothetical labor arbitrator would have written an opinion describing the
arbitrator's reasons for granting or denying his age-discrimination claim.
Opinion-writing is part of labor arbitration's culture, its accepted
unwritten rules."'8 It is a long-standing practice, sustained in large part
by expectations of parties.199
A well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court has stated, "tends to
engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying
the underlying agreement. '
Labor arbitration parties willingly

compensate the labor arbitrator for "opinion-writing" time, which most
often exceeds the time required to hear the case.2 ' They would tend

to find unacceptable a labor arbitrator who failed to write an opinion
explaining the basis for the arbitrator's conclusions. 2
Written labor arbitration opinions provide guidance to parties in
their future and ongoing relationships.0 3 The opinions are often very
helpful and are sought out as clues in attempting to determine whom to

select as arbitrator for a dispute. They may be found in commercial
publication services.z4 They are often cited in post-hearing labor
arbitration briefs and, in turn, by labor arbitrators in their opinions." 5
Labor arbitrators' opinions are also examined by judges when actions are
brought to vacate an arbitrator's award. 0 6

197. See id.
198. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 280-82.
199. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 280-82. "Attitudes vary as to the desirability
of reasoned opinions, but a large majority of parties and of arbitrators favor their use ....
"
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 60, at 281. "A well-reasoned opinion can contribute greatly to the
acceptance of the award by the parties by persuading them that the arbitrator understands the case
and that his award is basically sound." ELKotUi & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 281.; see also
Roger I. Abrams et al.,
ArbitralTherapy, 46 RUTGERs L. REv. 1751 (1994) ("a well-written opinion
can convince [the parties] that the arbitrator at least heard and understood their position."); Susan
A. Fitzgibbon, The JudicialItch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 485 (1990) (therapeutic value of written
arbitrator's opinion).
200. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598.
201. See supra notes 133-36.
202. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598-99.
203. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 9 (1951) (McCoy, Arb.).
204. The Bureau of National Affairs [hereinafter BNA] and the Commerce Clearing House
[hereinafter CCH] provide reports of Arbitration decisions in Labor Arbitration Reports and Arbitration Reports, respectively.
205. See, e.g., Bi-State Development Agency, 104 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 460 (1995) (Bailey, Arb.)
(wherein the arbitrator cites as many as three prior arbitration opinions in the case of a discharge for
violation of a company rule against weapons possession).
206. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 29 (noting that Labor Arbitrators' decisions
are seldom overturned on appeal). See, e.g., United Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)
(arbitrator decisions are usually sustained by the courts even where they incorrectly find facts or
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Judges attempting to review an arbitrator's award in Gilmer's case
would have found no opinion to review. The arbitrator's award, already
insulated from full judicial review because it is "final and binding" under
the industry rules, is further insulated from effective judicial review

because of the absence of an arbitrator's opinion. The Securities rules
governing a Gilmer-type arbitration require that "awards shall be in

writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators or in such manner as
is required by law." ' 7 Close examination of the rule reveals that it
departs only in form from the general commercial arbitration practice
found, for example, in the rules of the American Arbitration Association2 L-that the commercial arbitrator need not write an opinion unless
the parties jointly request one.2" 9
Consistent with settled commercial arbitration practice, the American
Arbitration Association rules provide that the arbitrator's "award shall be
in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators."2
The AAA
rules make a clear distinction between "award"-writing and "opinion"writing."' Nowhere do the rules require that the arbitrator write an

incorrectly interpret collective bargaining agreements). But on the rare occasions when a labor
arbitration decision is overturned, a court is often persuaded to do so by the reasoning expressed in
the arbitrator's written opinion. See, eg., Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915
F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,499 U.S. 922 (1991) (where the court examined the arbitrator's
opinion and found his award to be contrary to public policy); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local
776, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (where the court examined the
arbitrator's opinion and found a predisposition to favor one of the parties involved). Judicial review
could be made wholly ineffective by the absence of both an arbitrator's opinion and an adequate
record of the proceedings.
207. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2627, at 4322 (Rule 627(a)) (1995).
208. See COMMERCIAL ARBIRATION RULES, Rule 42 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993) (noting that
the award must be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators).
209. The commercial arbitration award is in the form of a bold statement: who shall receive what
and when he or she shall receive it. See GEORGE GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE To COMMERICAL
ARBITRATION 57-60 (ALI-ABA 1983). Commercial arbitrators rarely prepare opinions. Id.
210. COMMERCLAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 42 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993). Except for the
NYSE rules requirement that the arbitrator write a statement of the issues, both rules are consistent
with the well-settled arbitration practice of arbitrators not writing opinions in commercial arbitration
cases. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. One reason for the rule is that commercial
arbitrators, unlike labor arbitrators, are generally not paid for the first hearing day in a commercial
arbitration case. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 50 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993). Nor
are commercial arbitrators, unlike labor arbitrators, paid for any opinion-writing days if the hearing
does not exceed one day. See id. (making no mention of compensation for opinion writing). There
is thus no incentive for the arbitrator to write an opinion that might take one or two days to
write-for a total of two or three working days devoted to a case-without compensation. The rule
makes an exception for the payless day if "the parties otherwise agree ....
Id. But the parties to
a one-day commercial arbitration proceeding have little incentive to make the exception.
211. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 42 (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1993) (making no
mention whatsoever of "opinion" writing).
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opinion unless the parties jointly request one.
Oddly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gilmer interpreted the then

applicable NYSE rule to require an opinion by the arbitrator.2t 2 But
the rule applicable to Gilmer actually required no more than the names
of the parties, a summary of the issues, a summary of the relief awarded,
and a statement of any other issues resolved.2 3 It did not require that
the arbitrator explain the basis for the award. 2 4 Gilmer could have lost
a securities industry arbitration case with no more than a conclusory
sentence by the arbitrator.21 5
The securities industry arbitration rules require a verbatim record of
the hearing before the industry arbitrator.216 That led Interstate to
conclude in its Supreme Court brief on the merits that "[t]he ability of
a district court to review such an award is commensurate with its ability
to review a jury verdict...."
The analogy, however, is flawed. A judge in a jury trial, unlike a
judge reviewing an arbitrator's award, is able to take into account the

court's observations of the trial as well as the trial transcript in determining whether to set aside a jury's verdict. For example, an arbitrator
212. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). The Court did not leave
it "somewhat unclear whether a written opinion must be issued by the arbitrator," as two commentators have written. See Cheryl B. Bryson & Anurag Gulati, The Courts and Legislature Begin To
Adopt ADR Methods To Deal With Growing Number of Employment Discrimination Claims, 13 N.
ILL. L. REv. 221,239 (1993). The authors, no doubt misled by the Court, incorrectly conclude that
"the arbitration procedure at issue [in Gilmer] required written opinions." Id. at 239 n.99. See, e.g,
Barbara A. Wolfe v. Charles R. Schwab, NYSE Arbitration Docket No. 1993-003197 (Aug. 19,
1994), an NYSE arbitration where a sex discrimination hearing lasted 55 days and the arbitration
panel's opinion is a single paragraph in length.
213. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2627, at 4322-23 (Rule 627(e)) (1995).
214. See id. Proposals to require an opinion by the arbitrator were considered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and rejected. "After careful consideration of whether awards ought to
include reasons for arbitrators' awards ...we have concluded that it would not be appropriate at
this time to require the inclusion of written opinions in awards." See Self-Regulatory Organization:
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American Stock Exchange, Inc., Relating to the
Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 FED. REG. 21144, 21151
(1989). Interstate's United States Supreme Court Brief, filed in the Gilmer case, possibly confused
the Supreme Court by arguing that the arbitration rules applicable to Gilmer "require that the
arbitrators issue their award in writing." Respondent's Brief at 24, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 1990 WL 514441 (No. 90-18). This of course obliterates the distinction between an
award-which is entirely conclusory-and an opinion setting out the rationale in support of the
award. An award could read: "The claim is denied."
215. The Supreme Court adopted the view expressed in Interstate's Brief on the Merits that a
written award would provide an adequate basis for review of the arbitrator's decision. Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 31.
216. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2623, at 4321 (Rule 623) (1995).
217. Respondent's Brief at 23, Gilmer (No.90-18).
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operating under the securities industry arbitration rules could have
ignored testimony in favor of Gilmer's age-discrimination claim. The
reviewing judge would possibly not be aware of the omission's impact
on the arbitrator's decision. A judge presiding over a jury trial could
appropriately weigh the testimony against a jury's verdict. For example,
an arbitrator could make credibility resolutions in favor of Interstate's
witnesses that were entirely in conflict with credible documentary
evidence. The conflict would less likely escape a judge who observed
the witnesses. It would very likely escape the judge who reviewed the
arbitrator's decision. The problems emanating from the opinionless
arbitration forum are compounded by the industry rule providing for final
and binding effect of the arbitrator's decision. 1 8
In sum, even with all of its Supreme Court-noted deficiencies for the
resolution of statutory discrimination claims, labor arbitration for Gilmer
would have been a forum procedurally superior to his intended securities
industry arbitration forum. Nonetheless, the two forums are compared
here for the limited purpose of highlighting the unsatisfactory nature of
the arbitration forum to which the United States Supreme Court shunted
Gilmer's ADEA claim.21 9 This is not an argument in favor of labor
arbitration as an appropriate forum for statutory discrimination claims.
C.

Labor Arbitrators and Discrimination Grievances

Apart from labor arbitration's procedural advantages relative to the
securities industry arbitration procedures available to Gilmer, and its
procedural deficiencies relative to federal trial court procedures, labor
arbitration decisions favoring the grievant in a race, sex, religion or age
discrimination case are surprisingly rare. 0 They are almost nonexistent in published reports of labor arbitration decisions and labor
arbitration texts."

218. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2636, at 4328 (Rule 636(a)(1)) (1995). Rule 636 constrains
both the arbitrators fact-finding authority and the right to appeal an arbitrator's decision: "The
arbitrator's award is not required to include factual findings or legal reasoning and any party's right
to appeal or to seek modification of rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited." 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2636, at 4328 (Rule 636(a)(4)). The FAA contains grounds for setting aside a commercial
arbitration award, but they are narrowly confined to arbitrator misconduct. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988
& Supp. V 1994).
219. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
220. See generally Dallas L. Jones, The PresidentialAddress: The Educational Role of the
Academy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 1, 7-9 (BNA 1994).

221. Id.
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Statutory discrimination grievances are on the rise.2' However,
they are still a relatively small portion of the approximately 5,000
grievances resolved annually by labor arbitrators. 223 They are of two
kinds: those alleging breach of a just-cause clause 22 4 and those alleging
breach of a clause prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds.225
It can scarcely be doubted that a termination on grounds that would
violate a discrimination statute would also constitute a termination
without just cause. Just-cause for discipline embraces much more than
the employment-related conduct made unlawful by a discrimination
statute. By definition, a just-cause clause eliminates an essential element
of proof required in a discrimination case: evidence of a specific kind of

employer motivation, the absence of which is fatal to a judicial-forum
statutory discrimination claim.
Labor arbitrators have sometimes found discharges to be without
just cause after rejecting a contention that the discharge was motivated

by racial animus,1 6 but quite rarely. Even less often do they find
breaches

of collective-bargaining

agreement

clauses

prohibiting

222. Walter J. Gershenfeld, New Roles For Arbitrators: Will Arbitrators Work Really Be
Different, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

ARBITRATORS 275, 278-79 (BNA 1994).
223. See id.
224. See Walter C. Brauer III, Labor Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 185, 188-91 (BNA 1993).
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., American Fuel Cell and Coated Fabrics Co., 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1045 (1991)
(Nicholas, Arb.). The arbitrator found that the grievant had been "dealt with in a manner different
from that [of] ... other similarly situated employees." Id. at 1049. Additionally, "other employees
have been permitted to transfer into a senior employees's job before being permanently removed."
Id. The arbitrator found no racial discrimination. Id. However, he also found no just cause for the
termination. Id. In Denver Post Corp., the arbitrator found no just cause for the discharge of an
employee who had been hired as a part-time mailer, then went through a four-year pressman
apprenticeship upon completion of which he was terminated for poor attendance and tardiness, both
as a mailer and an apprentice. 103 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 417, 423-24 (1994) (DiFalco, Arb.). He had
received short-term suspensions in both positions. Id. at 423. The Union argued that the termination
was based on the grievant's race, as a union "eyewitness" testified that the foreman who made the
decision to terminate him had referred to him as a "lazy nigger." Id. at 421. The foreman denied
making the statement. Id. at 419.
Without making findings on the issue of the foreman's
credibility, the arbitrator sustained the grievance and reduced the termination to a 14-day suspension
on the ground that termination was too severe a penalty. Id. at 424. He concluded that "although
the Company has not demonstrated just cause for termination, the Union has conversely not
demonstrated that race discrimination was the reason for [it]." d. at 423-24. Given the earlier
suspensions of the grievant for excessive absenteeism and tardiness, it appears that the grievance
should have been denied, unless the decision was motivated by racial animus, in which case it should
have been sustained on that ground.
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discrimination banned by law.227 When a finding of racial discrimination is made, the case will likely be one in which evidence of discrimination reached the "smoking-gun" level. 8
Leading texts on labor arbitration rarely provide examples of
decisions favoring a grievant on racial discrimination grounds. 29 Only
a small portion of labor arbitrator decisions are published, mainly
because permission from both parties must be obtained before publication
is permitted.23 It is therefore likely that some arbitration decisions
favoring grievants in discrimination cases have not been reported.2 3'
To that extent, another attribute of labor arbitration is demonstrated: the
privacy of the process and the absence of the kind of public scrutiny that
follows public judicial proceedings.2 2
Future selection as an arbitrator is also a factor here. It is one
matter for a labor arbitrator to find in favor of a grievant in an exclusively contractual grievance, that is, one not implicating in any way a
statutory claim. For long term union-employer relationships in particular,
unions and employers are accustomed to losing their share of labor
arbitrators' decisions over close-call grievances which would not have
reached the arbitration level but for the difficult work-place issues they
presented. 3

227. In the most recent published 100 labor arbitration decisions published in Labor Arbitration
reports, an arbitrator found racial discrimination in one. The one case was International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 933 (1993) (Cohen, Arb.).
228. Id. The arbitrator determined that a discharge for excessive health-related absences was
without just cause. Id. at 936. He found that the grievant's health had been adversely affected by
a hostile racial atmosphere at work. Id. It included constant racial epithets from co-employees, a
white employee throwing burning toilet paper on him as he used a restroom toilet, a white emplo'ee
throwing water on him on a separate occasion as he used a restroom toilet. Id. at 935. In finding
a discharge attributable to a hostile racial atmosphere, the arbitrator volunteered, "I am not one to
accept a charge of racism easily." Id. One could search reported labor arbitration decisions in vain
for a similar statement concerning a just-cause clause, i.e, "I am not one to accept easily a charge
of discharged-without-just-cause." It is axiomatic that unions would regard as wholly unacceptable
in a discharge or discipline case an arbitrator who had made such a statement.
229. See ELKOtu= & ELKOURI, supra note 60, 98 (noting that "[s]ome doubt exists as to the
suitability of labor-management arbitration for resolving racial discrimination grievances, but proposals have been made to adapt it to the needs of such grievances.").
230. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supranote 149, at 317 (text of article II, section
C(1)(c) of the arbitrators' code, making it a "violation of professional responsibility for an arbitrator
to make public an award without consent of the parties."). The National Academy of Arbitrators,
American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the National
Mediation Board are parties to the Code.
231. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 149, at 317.
232. See CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 149, at 317.
233. See, e.g., In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 98 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1991) (Nolan, Arb.);
In re Beatrice/Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 383 (1989) (Brisco, Arb).
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It is quite another matter for a labor arbitrator to find that an
employer engaged in conduct in violation of a state or federal statute,
The scarcity of decisions favoring grievants in contractual discrimination
cases may be attributable in part to a widespread intuition among
arbitrators that to so find against an employer would have mutualselection ramifications going beyond those ordinarily associated with
employer or union losses in contract-interpretation cases.
D.

A Gilmer Commercial Arbitration

Gardner-Denverand Barrentinecomments on arbitrator competence
to decide statutory discrimination claims were necessarily limited to labor
arbitrators.234 What of non-labor arbitrators like Gilmer's intended
arbitrators, those not mutually selected by a labor union and an employer
to resolve disputes over the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement? Are they commercial arbitrators, governed by commercial
arbitration law and commercial arbitration procedural standards, or
arbitrators of a new class?
For many years, a broad definition of "commercial arbitration" was
arbitration that is not labor arbitration.235 Commercial arbitration was
formerly limited, as its name connotes, almost exclusively to disputes
between business entities.236 The subjects of "commercial arbitration",
as earlier defined, have expanded to include medical malpractice,
landlord-tenant, and various kinds of domestic disputes, among others.237 They embrace the new and growing category of disputes
between employers and unrepresented employees, and those between
employers and union-represented employees when their claims are
outside the coverage of their collective bargaining agreements. As a
result of this trend, the American Arbitration Association has now
transferred non-labor employment cases from its roster of commercial
arbitrators to a new panel of "employment arbitrators."23' 8 They are
available to employers and employees who jointly agree to use them, as
provided in the AAA governing rules.239

234. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1980).
235. See generally Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 343.
236. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 60, at 1.
237. GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at 3 (1991 & Supp.
1995).
238. See EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOUTnON RULES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1991).
239. See AMER. ARBITRATION ASS'N COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1993).
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If Gilmer's age-discrimination claim had been heard under American
Arbitration Association employment arbitration rules, he would have
joined in the selection of an arbitrator from a panel of arbitrators
established and maintained by the American Arbitration Association, a
neutral private entity. The hearing, as in most labor arbitration
proceedings, and in all of them conducted under AAA labor arbitration
rules, would have been conducted without application of formal rules of
evidence. Gilmer would have paid a one-half share of the arbitrator's
fee.
Unlike labor arbitration, no cadre of full-time conventional
commercial arbitrators ever developed.2 4 There is no national organization of conventional commercial arbitrators paralleling, for example,
the National Academy of Arbitrators.24 '
The typical conventional
commercial arbitrator is a part-time lawyer, a businessperson, or a
university professor.242 For conventional commercial arbitration there is
very little in the way of a counterpart to the "permanent" labor arbitrator
who serves during the life of a collective bargaining agreement and is
often reappointed indefinitely.2 43
Gilmer's arbitration would not have been a conventional commercial
arbitration case. It would have fallen within the newly developing sub
class of employment arbitration. 2 " As work for labor arbitrators
declines, consistent with the shrinking size of the union movement in the
United States, many labor arbitrators are seeking to become members of
panels like those created by the American Arbitration Association for
employment cases--4hose not involving unions.245
Some members of those panels are lawyers or academics.246
Others, usually operating independently and apart from the AAA, are
retired judges who include employment disputes among a wide range of
disputes they hear for substantial fees.247 The important quality of
mutual arbitrator selection, long the hallmark of "arbitration", is what
places the new employment arbitration panels apart from the unilaterally

240. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 365-66. The authors note that in February of
1994, the AAA reported there were no full-time arbitrators on its commercial panel. Hayford &
Peeples, supra note 192, at 366 n.91.
241. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 365-66.

242. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 366.
243. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 365-66.
244. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 358.
245. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 366-67.
246. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 366.

247. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 366.
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appointed panel of industry arbitrators who decide disputes concerning
employment
and other matters in their industry or place of employ8
ment.

24

Gilmer's securities industry was in that tier. It would not have fit
any employment arbitration category established, for example, by the
American Arbitration Association, if for no other reason than the
securities industry's creation of its own pool of arbitrators and Gilmer's
inability to select mutually with his former employer the arbitrator for his
ADEA claim.
The non-union character of Gilmer's securities industry arbitration
made it ostensibly identifiable as a commercial arbitration. But
conventional commercial arbitration rules, unlike Gilmer's securities
industry arbitration rules, are always designed to foster arbitrator
neutrality.249 Conventional commercial arbitration is always unconditionally consensual, a product of a mutual agreement to arbitrate as an
alternative to judicial litigation which both parties want to avoid.250
For the sub class of unilaterally promulgated industry arbitration,
imposed as a condition of employment, only one party, the employer,
wants to avoid litigation.251' As a potential party to a conventional
commercial arbitration over his discharge, Gilmer could have avoided
arbitration at his option and proceeded, unencumbered by it, to federal
court with his ADEA allegations.
IV. GILMER AS A POST-ARBITRATION PLAINTIFF IN COURT
"Final and binding" under the NYSE rules applicable to Gilmer had
a two-pronged effect on Mr. Gilmer: it would have made it very difficult,
as calculated by the securities industry, for him to obtain judicial review
of an arbitrator's award on his age discrimination claim.252 At the
same time, the "final and binding" aspect of an award would have been
a formidable barrier in the path of Gilmer's effort to seek a postarbitration trial de novo.253

248. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
249. Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 364-66.
250. See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 192, at 351.
251. See Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643 (N.Y. 1989); Morris v. Snappy
Car Rental, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1991).
252. See 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCII) 2627, at 4322 (Rule 627(b)) (1995).
253. See id.
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A.

Judicial Review of a Gilmer Arbitration Award

For an age-discrimination arbitration filed by Gilmer, lost and
appealed in an effort to vacate the award, Interstate would have pointed
to the NYSE rule providing that "[u]nless the law directs otherwise, all
awards rendered pursuant to this Code shall be deemed final and not
subject to review or appeal."2' 4 The language goes further than the
finality clauses almost always found in collective bargaining agreements.
They use the words "final and binding" without the additional text found
in the securities industry rule, ". . . not subject to review or appeal."255
Consequently, in opposing an attempt to vacate an award adverse to
Gilmer, Interstate could have argued that the securities industry's finality
rules deserve even more respect than the finality rules associated with
collective bargaining agreements. Because labor arbitrators are upheld,
even when they incorrectly find facts and incorrectly interpret collective
bargaining agreements,"6 the securities industry arbitration-finality rule
would be subject to the same standard, at least.
Courts generally overturn labor arbitration awards with greater
frequency than they do awards in conventional commercial arbitration
cases.257 In Gilmer, involvement of a statutory claim, perhaps warranting closer judicial scrutiny, would have been offset by the explicit
preclusion of judicial review in the securities industry agreements to
arbitrate.
In the Gilmer case, the Supreme Court skirted this issue with a
reference to statutory standards for setting aside arbitration awards.259
Using an analysis commonly employed by promoters of arbitration who
seek to promote judicial review as one of arbitration's positive qualities,
the Court cited Federal Arbitration Act26 grounds for vacating an
arbitrator's award: "corruption, fraud, or undue means... misconduct
"261

254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The DecliningState ofLabor Arbitration,48 ARB.
J. 18, 20-22 (Sept. 1993).

257. Id. at 20. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. sets the standard for judicial review of
commercial arbitration awards. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). The Court found that the misconstruction of
a contract is not open to judicial review. Id. at 203 n.4.
258. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
259. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).

260. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
261. See id. § 10; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
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These are special and narrow grounds for vacating an arbitrator's
award. They have virtually no bearing on the question whether the
award was wrong as a matter of law or fact. Those are the issues treated
by the Supreme Court's standards on limited judicial review of labor
arbitration decisions. 262 If an agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims and waive the venue provisions of federal statutes is
enforceable in the Gilmer context, an explicit finality clause, cutting off
judicial review of arbitrators' awards, will likely be regarded as
enforceable.
Even if review is granted, most arbitration decisions in nonunion
employment disputes will be concluded on factual grounds.263 The
arbitrator's findings of fact will probably be given great weight to the
limited extent that they might be discernible in the absence of an
arbitrator's opinion.2 4
B.

Finality-Affected De Novo Judicial Proceedings

Suppose Mr. Gilmer, like Mr. Alexander, had taken his agediscrimination claim to arbitration after his Supreme Court loss. Then
suppose he lost the arbitration. Would a court have heard his ADEA
case, as courts heard Alexander's Title VII case and Barrentine's FLSA
case, after their arbitration losses? Or would the absence of a GilmerInterstate collective-bargaining relationship and the presence of his prior
agreement to arbitrate, prompt a different result?
Using the "final and binding" language in Gilmer's agreement to
arbitrate, Interstate would have argued for Gilmer's dismissal from any
post-arbitration ADEA judicial proceeding, in that the Gardner-DenverBarrentine cases are distinguishable. These would not have been easy
arguments to refute. "Final and binding" in this post-arbitration context
would mean more than it did in Gardner-Denverand Barrentine,where
the Court was appropriately able to draw sharp lines of distinction
between contractual and statutory claims.
Gilmer, unlike the plaintiffs in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine,
would not have been in a position to argue that the arbitrator resolved a

262. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); United

Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
263. Eva Robbins, Unfair Dismissal: Emerging Issues in the Use of Arbitration As A Dispute
Resolution Alternativefor the Nonunion Workforce, 12 FORDRAM URB. L.J. 437, 447-48 (1984).
264. Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration As A Continuation of the Collective Bargaining

Process, 66 CHI-KENT L. REv. 571, 622 (1990).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss2/3

42

1996]

Alleyne:
Statutory
Discrimination
Claims:
Rights "Waived" and Lost in the
Forum
in the Arbitration
and Lost
"Waived"
Rights

contract claim in his case. Nor could he have argued that he was now
pressing a distinct statutory claim. Preclusion of a trial de novo would
have been consistent with Interstate's intent to keep claims like Gilmer's
out of court in both pre-arbitration and post-arbitration contexts.
It would also have been consistent with what the judiciary finds
most attractive about ADR: a reduction in judicial caseloads.265 Judges
also tend to dislike discrimination cases.26 The trial judge in Gilmer's
case, for example, observed in open court, "There's no form of litigation
267
I would more gladly forgo than employment discrimination suits.
Other differences between Gilmer as a post-arbitration plaintiff and the
status of Alexander and Barrentine as post-arbitration plaintiffs would
likely have supported Interstate's arguments in favor of motions to
dismiss a Gilmer post-arbitration judicial complaint.
First, in his securities industry arbitration, Gilmer could have
controlled his case in a manner not available to Alexander or Barrentine
in their labor arbitration forums. Second, Gilmer was not a third-party
beneficiary of a collective bargaining agreement, in that he, not a union
or any other entity, would have been the moving party in his securities
industry arbitration.
No one but Gilmer could have waived his right to use the ADEA
forum provided by Congress. Gilmer himself "waived" it--under
compulsion of course--but the inequality of bargaining power argument265 he might have presented to the Supreme Court in support of
his adhesion-contract claim would already have been rejected in the
earlier phase of his case.269
For all of these reasons, Gilmer, it appears would not have been
entitled to a judicial trial following his arbitration loss. Consequently,
it is not possible to view the arbitration required by Gilmer's agreement
as merely a procedural step he had to exhaust before moving on to
federal court. Suppose he had not been dismissed from federal court.

265. See Feller, supra note 256, at 19.
266. See Joint Appendix for Writ of Cert. at 29, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18).
267. Id.
268. The Supreme Court noted in Gilmer that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however,
is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context." 500 U.S. at 33. The inequality of bargaining claim "is best left for resolution in specific
cases." Id. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995).
269. See Kim Dayton, The Myth Of Alternative Dispute Resolution In The FederalCourts, 76
IOWA L. REv. 889, 898-905 (1991).
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V.

GILMER AT TRIAL IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT

As an ADEA plaintiff, Gilmer could have had a jury trial in federal
district court. 270 The substantive law of his age discrimination case
would have been defined by the ADEA,27' unencumbered by substantive-law affecting procedural irregularities.
The trial judge would have instructed the jury on the elements of
ADEA substantive law, arguably making the jury itself more expert on
the ADEA than the securities industry arbitrators who would have heard
Gilmer's claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, authorized by Act of Congress and created
by the United States Supreme Court, would have governed, meaning the
availability of full-scale discovery: depositions, interrogatories, and
requests for admission.
The jury is chosen from a randomly selected pool, 272 not a pool
selected by one of the parties, as was true for Gilmer.273 The judge or
the attorneys for both sides may examine all prospective jurors in federal
court civil proceedings. 74 A judge chosen by neither party, paid by
taxpayers, presides.
The jury's interest in the case would terminate with its verdict and
discharge. Whether in assessing liability or damages, compensatory or
punitive, jurors are not affected by an obligation, real or fancied, to
please anyone in any industry. Their future employment and earning
power would not be influenced in any way by their verdicts. Patent
violations of the ADEA, matched by appropriate jury verdicts, would be
well publicized, with deterrent effect. An incorrect verdict, not set aside
by the trial judge, or the trial judge's misapplication of the law, could be
overturned by appellate judges having the benefit of a verbatim
transcript, findings of fact, and perhaps an opinion by the trial judge.
None of these attributes of the trial process would have been duplicated
in the securities industry arbitration set up for Gilmer and others
similarly situated.275

270.
271.
272.
273.

29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988).
See generally id. §§ 621-634.
28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1988).
See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.

274. 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (1988).
275. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has an excessively high caseload and
backlog of cases. Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VIls Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories,
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REv. 374, 384 (1995). Long delays could face a Title VII plaintiff, who
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VI.

IMPLICATIONS BEYOND GILMER

A. Employer-Favored Outcomes
Under Gilmer, an employee's inability realistically to bargain out of
an agreement to waive judicial-forum rights as a condition of employment, is not a factor in determining whether the employee's contractual
waiver is enforceable. 6 Possibilities of "market forces" permitting
employment applicants to pick a job on the basis of an employer's
disinclination to require a Gilmer-type agreement to arbitrate will decline
as more employers require them. All such agreements may be crafted to
provide for opinionless arbitrator decisions, limited or no discovery, a
panel of arbitrators unilaterally selected by the employer, and a "final and
binding" decision by the arbitrator.
They can be made broad enough to cover all statutory discrimination
claims: race, sex, religion, national origin, handicap status.27 7 Of
course some unilaterally-created employment arbitrations will be
structured with procedures that are decidedly more equitable than those
the securities industry afforded Gilmer.2 7' Nonetheless, some attributes

must first use the EEOC's administrative procedures before commencing an action in federal court.
Susanne Bums, Note, EEOC Consent Decrees:Nonbinding on UnsatisfiedPrivate Parties Under
Title VII, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 629, 629-30 (1985). An employee might well be disinclined to
seek Title VII relief in federal court on the ground that casehandling delay more than offsets the
greater certainty of prevailing in a judicial forum. Other employees might place a premium on the
greater certainty of winning and recovering a larger award before ajury than could be obtained from
an arbitrator. Gilmer deprives the employee of weighing these options. It also deprives an employee
of the option of filing a discrimination complaint under a state law, for example, the California
discrimination law, where casehandling is swifter than federal EEOC casehandling.
276. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
277. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
278. A Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, made up of individuals
from "diverse organizations involved in labor and employment law" has recommended a due process
protocol for mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes arising out of the employment
relationship. See PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT ON JOB BIAS DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 91, d34 (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT]. The report encourages
the use of arbitration and mediation for statutory disputes in order to reduce "delays which now arise
out of the huge backlog of cases pending before administrative agencies and courts." Id. It recommends a set of arbitration "due process" standards, none of which were available to Gilmer under
the securities industry arbitration procedures. Id. They include such basics as the right to
representation, attorneys' fees, "[a]dequate but limited discovery", mutual selection of arbitrators
from a roster of qualified and independently appointed arbitrators, arbitrator training, remedies equal
to those a court is empowered to award and the sharing of arbitrator fees. Id. The arbitrator would
be empowered to determine how arbitrator fees should be allocated if an employee party is unable
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common to non-union, private contractual arbitration processes make all
of them less effective than courts for the vindication of statutory
discrimination claims. Once again comparisons among different kinds
of arbitration are illustrative.
Labor arbitration is between two institutional interests, employer and
union.2 19 In Gilmer-type arbitration, one party, the employer, will have
an institutional character. Employers, and far less likely, individual
employees, will track the records of arbitrators through networking and
internal record keeping. Arbitrators will likely receive successive
arbitration assignments from the same employer with far greater
frequency than they will arbitrate for the same individual employee
claimant.
Consequently, in the Gilmer-type arbitration setting, employers will
naturally dominate the arbitrator selection process, as individual
employees will generally lack the resources to participate effectively in
it. Even if a "plaintiff's bar" operates at maximum effectiveness for
individual employment claimants, by its nature it could not be the equal
of institutional union interests in the arbitrator selection process. In the
Gilmer-type non-union setting, arbitrators could well yield to the
temptation to favor institutional employer interests.
The beguiling problem of how to compensate the arbitrator in a
manner free of conveying the appearance of bias, or of making the
claimant first pay the arbitrator as a condition of receiving the arbitrator's
decision-making services, seems impossible to overcome with "due
process", procedures. The ability of arbitrators to remain free of being
influenced by considerations of future acceptability will be stretched to
the limit in cases where (a) the employee should prevail on the question
whether the employer violated a discrimination statute, (b) the employee
should receive punitive damages, (c) the employer should bear all or
most of the arbitrator's fee, (d) the employee should receive attorney's
fees, and (e) the arbitrator's decision is, as it will be in almost all of
these cases, subject to very limited judicial review. Even in the best
procedural setting, statutory discrimination claims are peculiarly

to provide an equal share of fees. Id. Signatories to the agreement are lawyers from one
management-side and one union-side labor law firm, the president of the National Academy of

Arbitrators, the management co-chair, union co-chair, and neutral co-chairs of the Arbitration
Committee of the Labor and Employment Section of the American Bar Association, general counsel
of the American Arbitration Association, general counsel of the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union. On the critical Gilmer issue of whether an employee can be compelled to waive
a judicial forum in favor of the prescribed arbitration, the Task Force was unable to reach agreement.
279. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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amenable to the claimant-oriented disadvantages ordinarily associated
with the informalities of ADR.
Non-union arbitrations conducted with business entities on both
sides will generally have fewer bargaining-power inequities and greater
possibilities for procedural fairness than non-union arbitrations with a
business entity on one side and an individual on the other. Even the
better arbitration procedures that employees or applicants for employment
are compelled to accept as a condition of working, those with elements
sometimes described as providing "due process," will fall short of the
procedural safeguards available in federal courts. Few, if any of them,
for example, will provide for judicial appeals as of right from an adverse
arbitration award.
This is acceptable for labor arbitration grievances over the meaning
of collective bargaining agreements containing subject matter peculiar to
the collective-bargaining environment and largely foreign to the
experience of judges.280 Except for waiver of the right to appeal, made
in a position of relatively equal bargaining strength, this is not acceptable
for decision making on the meaning of statutes enacted by a legislature.
The best of these individual-employer contractual arbitration procedures
would permit an arbitrator to hand down a "final and binding" decision
that no federal trial judge could emulate without suffering reversal by a
higher court.2 8 t
The problem is not of similar magnitude in the labor arbitration
forum, where the consequences of limited judicial review fall with a
rough equality on union and employer parties who have generally equal
numbers of arbitration wins and losses. 2'
For about every labor
arbitration a union or employer should have won but lost, there is a case
in which its opposition suffered similarly.2 3 For every labor arbitration that should have been won, and was, and might have been over-

280. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. The best arbitration procedures would
include those recommended by the ADR Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in

Employment. See PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT, supra note 278, at d34. One of its recommendations
is that the "award should be final and binding and the scope of review should be limited."
PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT, supranote 278, at d34. To the extent that they are adopted, the ADR Task
Force recommendations, without a recommendation against waiver of the tight to pursue a judicial
remedy, would provide an ostensibly fair forum for employees.
282. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supranote 180, at 611 (discussing arbitrators' different opinions
regarding the implications of a "just cause" limitation on management's right to discharge in
collective bargaining agreements).
283. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 180, at 613 (discussing various arbitrators' views
regarding management's right to discharge probationary employees).
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turned on appeal if an appeal had been available, the arbitration winner's
opposition will have a parallel experience.
In contrast, statutory discrimination grievances relegated to Gilmertype arbitration forums are virtually assured employer-favored outcomes
for the reasons noted in this article: the manner of selecting, controlling,
and compensating arbitrators, the privacy of the process and how it
catalytically arouses an arbitrator's desire to be acceptable to one side.
There, limited judicial review heavily favors the dominant arbitration
winner.
B.

Prejudice and ADR

Both legal and behaviorist scholars have addressed the question
whether any ADR decisionmaker's racial and other minority-based bias
is less likely to be ameliorated in informal dispute resolution settings.2" The few empirical studies on the question conclude in the
affirmative on the general basis that procedural safeguards of formal
dispute resolution settings will more likely check the natural human
tendency to "prejudge and make irrational categorizations." 25
The antipodes considered in these writings are adversary and
nonadversarial procedures, comparing for example, judicial proceedings with informal efforts to mediate disputes or resolve them in
neighborhood justice centers. It is thus questionable whether the scholars
who have studied the issue of decision-maker bias in dispute resolution
considered the various degrees of formality associated with different
kinds of arbitration proceedings.
In the broadest use of the term, arbitration can be almost as
adversarial as the most formal judicial proceedings. It can also be so
informal as to be entirely nonadversarial.2 87 Different classes of
arbitration have different degrees of formality. Labor arbitration, for

284. Lawrence Bobo, Prejudice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in 12 STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND Soc'Y 147, 149 (Susan S.Silbey & Austin Sarat eds., 1992).
285. Richard Delgado et al., FairnessAnd Formality: Minimizing The Risk of Prejudice In
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1389. Among others, Professor Delgado
cites as supporting authority, John Thibaut et al., ProceduralJustice as Fairness,26 STAN. L. REV.
1271, 1288 (1974) and E. Allen Lind et al.,A Cross-CulturalComparisonof the Effect ofAdversary
and InquisitorialProcess on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L. REV. 271 (1976); see also
John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentationand Bias In Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV.
386, 388 (1972).
286. See, e.g., Thibaut et al., supra note 285, at 1273-75.
287. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 180, at 182.
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example, is generally less formal than conventional commercial

arbitration.88
What is apparent in Gilmer-type arbitration proceedings is excessive
informality of a kind that brings them within the zone of unchecked
decision-maker bias. The combination of forum privacy, the opinionless
decision (as distinguished from a conclusory award), limited discovery
and limited judicial review is what makes Gilmer-type forums peculiarly
amenable to the dangers of unrestrained decision-maker bias.289
"[P]rejudiced persons are least likely to act on their beliefs if the
immediate environment confronts them with the discrepancy between
their professed ideals and their personal hostilities against outgroups . 290
The Gilmer-type forum insulates the arbitrator from any such
confrontation.
Its unilateral selection of the arbitrator seriously
compounds the problem of possible bias-influenced outcomes.
C.

Deterrence

Can a model employment arbitration serve as a deterrent to wouldbe violators of discrimination statutes? 29' The answer seems plain. The
two-fold purpose of the ADEA, like that of any social policy statute, is

to provide a remedy for individual complainants and deter conduct the
statute forbids.
For related reasons, private contractual arbitration can scarcely serve
either purpose. Its contractually private nature, combined with other of

288. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 180, at 3-4.
289. Compare Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1995) (judgment for
employer reversed because trial judge used sexual stereotypes to evaluate female plaintiff's behavior
and credibility) with Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (arbitrator's award vacated on ground of statements by arbitrator indicating
sexual bias). Decisionmaker bias in the judicial proceeding was remedied by the kind of judicial
review ordinarily available to litigants in federal court proceedings, including the availability of the
judge's findings of fact and a trial transcript. Catchpole, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d at 443-45. Inthe labor
arbitration proceeding, judicial review was unusual because of the "final and binding" nature of the
labor arbitrator's award. Stroehman Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441. The reviewing court relied
exclusively on the record in the case and the statements made in the arbitrator's opinion. Id. at
1444-45. No comparable opinion would have been available to a court reviewing Gilmer's arbitration had he used the arbitration forum before or after his attempt to proceed in federal court.
290. Delgado et al., supra note 285, at 1387.
291. "Model" is defined here to mean the kind of arbitration process recommended by the ADR
Protocol. The Protocol does not recommend a public forum or a voluntary choice of arbitration for
employment disputes. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 149, at 317 (noting
article II, section C(1)(a) of the Labor Arbitrator's Code).
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its attributes providing an incentive for the arbitrator to reach employerfavored outcomes, strips the process of the deterrence quality ordinarily
associated with a remedial statute. The public can be excluded and
effectively kept insulated from knowledge of the arbitration proceedings
and its outcome.2 92
Quite unresponsively, it seems, the Court agreed with Gilmer that
the ADEA addresses individual complaints and also furthers "important
social policies" of deterring age discrimination.2 93 It concluded,
though, that the deterrent effect of the statute will hold so long as "the
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause
prospective litigant effectively may
2 94
of action in the arbitral forum.
This single-sentence response avoids the issue, surveyed here, of the
adequacy of Gilmer's intended arbitration forum and, as well, the
question whether statutory discrimination decisions reached in a
contractually private forum can in any way deter potential violators. In
Los Angeles, a racial harassment case was tried before a jury. Plaintiff
won a verdict and was awarded $1,250,000.295 The case was given full
coverage in the Los Angeles Times.296
A strikingly similar case was decided by a labor arbitrator.2 97 The
grievant employee was awarded reinstatement with back pay in the
amount of what he would have earned had he not been discharged, less
any income he earned in the interim period.2 98 No interest was
awarded on the amount of back pay due. 299 The case is reported in the
Labor Arbitration Reports,30 0 a publication with few readers who are
not engaged in labor and employment relations work of some kind.
Apart from the disparate remedies awarded the two discrimination
complainants, the two cases also illustrate differences in deterrence value.
The proceedings in the labor arbitration case were private. 301 The
arbitrator had to solicit permission from both parties to publish his

292. CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 149, at 317 (article II, section
C(I)(a)).
293. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
294. Id. at 28.
295. Maura Dolan, Vindication, At Long-Last: Ex-Employer Must Pay Homeless Man $1.25
Millionfor Racial Harassment,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at BI.
296. Id.
297. B-Line Sys., Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 933 (1993) (Cohen, Arb.).

298. B-Line Sys., 100 Lab. Arb. at 936.
299. Id.

300. The Labor Arbitration Reporter series is a publication of the Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc.

301. B-Line Sys., 100 Lab. Arb. at 933.
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decision in Labor Arbitration Reports. 2 It seems evident that a
statutory social policy of deterrence, driven in part by the possibility of
embarrassment over publicized public law violations, is not effectively
served in any private arbitration forum.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration is a possible solution to problems of overcrowded courts
and long delays in acquiring a final judicial decision. Its advantages of
speed and informality, to the extent that they exist, should be offered as
inducements to enter into truly voluntary agreements to arbitrate,
meaning, at minimum, those not a condition of being employed. 3

Once employed (without having to sign such an agreement in order to be
employed) an employee with a statutory discrimination claim could then
weigh and balance arbitration's possible advantages of speed and
informality, to the extent that they existed, against the range of possible
substantive-rights affecting procedural disadvantages noted here,
including those described in this article as being beyond the capacity of
the arbitration process to overcome.
Having done that, an employee with a statutory discrimination claim
might then decide whether to elect arbitration or a judicial trial for its
resolution. No pre-dispute waiver, entered into as a condition of
employment, could be truly voluntary.
Gilmer's "waiver" of a judicial forum was voluntary in name
only."° He was entitled to the courtroom Congress had in mind when
302. An arbitrator's publication of a labor arbitration decision without having received the
consent of both parties to do so is a violation of the NAA's Code of Professional Responsibility.
CODES OF PROFESStONAL RESPONSIBILrIY, supra note 149, at 317 (article II, section C(l)(a))
(indicating that under the Code, the arbitrator must solicit permission after the decision is written
and sent to the parties, so that they may have an opportunity to object to publication after reading

it).
303. Arguably, the Gilmer decision might be limited to instances in which the indiyidual who
signs an employer-formulated agreement to arbitrate employment claims is an "experienced
businessman." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. The Supreme Court so characterized Gilmer. Id. This was
the Court's partial response to Gilmer's adhesion-contract argument. Id. Gilmer's status as a
presumably intelligent businessman goes merely to his ability to understand what he was signing.
It does not address the relevant question of his inability to bargain out of signing the agreement.
To that extent, Gilmer was as disadvantaged as a high school dropout who applied for a different
job with Gilmer's employer.
304. The question whether an employee may be fired for refusing to accept her employer's
arbitration forum for a sexual harassment claim is being litigated in federal court and could very well
reach the Supreme Court as a novel issue arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See Margaret A. Jacobs, MandatoryArbitrationAgreement FacesDirect ChallengeBy EEOC, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at B2.
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it described the venue for an ADEA age discrimination claim as "... any
court of competent jurisdiction ....,305 He would have had that
courtroom, except for the United States Supreme Court's decision
consigning him to a procedurally deficient arbitration forum, unilaterally
set up and administered by his employer. This left him the options of
accepting it or not working, which was justified by the Court on the
dubious premise of a forum switch with no loss of statutory substantive
rights.

305. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988 & Supp. V. 1994).
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